Eric
Havelock: Plato and the Transition From Orality to Literacy
Eric
Havelock - who was a visiting scholar at University of Toronto -
brought together Rhys Carpenter's evidence for the late
introduction of the alphabet, Milman Parry's findings on
oral-formulaic patterns, and Plato's pronouncements on the nature
of epic poetry, to support his theory concerning the impact of the
alphabet on Greek culture and education.
Following
Carpenter, Havelock pointed out that early Greek culture was
"wholly oral"and
after the invention of the alphabet, there was "a long period
of resistance to the use of letters," so that literacy was
not achieved in Athens until nearly three hundred years later.[1]Greek
"society became literate only by slow degrees" (1986:
29). Oral habits of communication and instruction "persisted
long after the alphabet had theoretically made a reading culture
possible" (1963: 45-46). Between Homer and Plato,
argued Havelock, the method of preserving the culture began to
change as Greek education became alphabetized. Even up to
Plato's time, he said, the introduction of the alphabet made
"little practical difference to the educational system or to
the intellectual life of adults" (1963: 38).
Since Plato's writings are prose dialogues and not works of epic
poetry, Havelock placed "Plato near the end of the great
transition from oral to literate habits of communication"
(1963: 97). Plato describes a cultural situation "in
which oral communication still dominates all the important
relationships and valid transactions of life." He
concluded that "it is only too likely that Plato is
describing a situation which was on the way to being changed as he
wrote" (1963: 41).
Havelock
applied Parry's findings concerning the oral verse of Homer to
problems in our reconstruction of the history of early Greek
education. He sought to demonstrate that the "formulaic
technique was employed as the instrument of education" by the
pre-literate Greeks (1963: 123). He asked, "How did
this civilization preserve its laws, traditions, historical sense
and its technical skills?" He pointed out that
preservation and transmission of the tradition can never rely
completely on the "give and take" between generations.
To function, a social group needs some kind of "standardized
linguistic statement" that describes and enforces a common
consciousness, shared habit patterns and collective values.
In an oral society, this statement is preserved in the memories of
living people and passed down through the generations. The
collective memory provides the content of the "educational
apparatus" of the group. To become available for "transmission
through the educational apparatus, the tradition has to be
verbally preserved in permanent and unaltered form . . ."
(1963: 290-91). People had to be "assisted in their
memorization of the living word by every possible mnemonic device
which could print this word indelibly upon the
consciousness." How can memory retain elaborate
linguistic statements without changing them in transmission from
one person to another and from one generation to the next?
According to Havelock, "the only possible verbal technology
available . . . was that of the rhythmic word organized in verbal
and metrical patterns which were unique enough to retain their
shape" (1963: 42-43). Poetry functioned as a technology
for preserving cultural identity. It was used by the Greeks
as form of education, he asserted, "as a way of preserving
and transmitting the accumulated body of knowledge in the absence
of writing." Homeric verse was therefore central to
Greek education prior to Plato
not
on the grounds that we would offer, namely poetry's inspirational
and imaginative effects, but on the ground that it provided a
massive repository of useful knowledge, a sort of encyclopedia of
ethics, politics, history, and technology which the effective
citizen was required to learn as the core of his educational
equipment (1963: 27).
According
to Havelock, poetry did not mean the same thing for the Greeks
that it means to us. Greek oral poetry was a kind of
"tribal encyclopedia," an "indoctrination which
today would be comprised in a shelf of text books and works of
reference." Poetry was the "container" for
all philosophy, history and science. It was "first and
last a didactic instrument for transmitting the tradition"
(1963: 43).
Havelock
asserted that poetry was the "sole mechanism" for
memorization and preservation in the absence of written record.
It served this function via three devices: first, the employment
of rhythms and formulas to aid in the recall and re-use of the
cultural record (1963: 100), second, through the use of what he
called "verbal formulas;" and third, through the
reduction of all experience to a great story or a connected series
of stories. Poetic rhythm involves consistent repetition of
patterns of language sounds. Verbal formulas - what Parry
and Lord called types and themes - entail the repetition of
"an identical order" in different passages (1963:
82-84). The third device, that of the great story, involves
gathering together a number of small stories into a coherent
series of episodes focussed around "several prominent
agents" who "act and speak with some overall
consistency" (1963: 175-76). Episodes provide a "frame
of reference, the chapter headings, the library catalogue, within
which the memory can find markers" by locating a
narrative situation in the context of a huge and compendious
story. In this way, Homer's Iliad and Odyssey
are kinds of catalogues of the history and the geography of the
Greeks. Hesiod's Theogony classifies the gods, their
functions and families, while the Works and Days is a
catalogue of "exhortations, parables, proverbs, aphorisms,
sayings, wise saws and instances, interlarded with stories"
(1963: 295).
Havelock
linked Parry's findings on the imitative nature of the formulaic
patterns of Homeric poetry with Plato's criticism of the poets in
the Republic, and with the negative assessment of art in other
dialogues. He pointed out that Plato was claiming for
himself the place he was asking the poets to vacate. With
the ascendance of literacy, he argued, more and more of the
cultural heritage was set down in writing, and the ways of the old
tradition were challenged. Plato=s attack on the poets was,
according to Havelock, a rejection of the oral tradition in which
the bards merely imitated and copied words and phrases without any
genuine knowledge of what they were doing. Plato's assault,
he maintained, was a rejection of the formulaic style produced by
the Greek oral mentality, a state of mind that was in tension with
new modes of thought made possible by the effects of the alphabet.
According
to Havelock, the transition from oral to literate patterns touched
off changes in vocabulary, syntax, and in the basic categories of
human thought. The terminology used by Plato and Aristotle
to define and categorize the
operations of consciousness, he argued, had to pass through a long
period of development (1963: xi). He cited the findings of
Harold Cherniss to support his theory that "the metaphysical
interpretations of pre-Platonic thinkers which are found in
Aristotle's own works are in large measure accommodated to the
problems and indeed the terminology of his own system."[2]He
presented passages in the Republic (522a-530b) as evidence that
Plato was creating a new frame of discourse and a new kind of
vocabulary. Plato, he claimed, was arguing for an approach
that focused not on "modeling and reproducing." He
was "demanding instead a discourse which shall rearrange
phenomena under general headings or categories" (1963:
259-60). The language of categories and universals, claimed
Havelock, refers to what would be called "concept" in
modern terminology. He said that Plato avoided the notion of
concept or mental construction that would make things like justice
and goodness "abstract, arbitrary and relative conceptions of
the human intellect." Instead, he argued, Plato saw
them as "somehow representing the cosmic structure
independent of human cognition and so labeled them visual shapes
or forms." Thus, in the development of human thought,
the theory of forms was a transition between the "image-thinking"
of oral poetry and the abstract concepts of philosophy made
possible by writing.
As the "first philosopher to adapt sustained oral teaching into
written discourse," Plato must have been "writing in the
crucial moment of transition," from orality to literacy, said
Havelock (1986: 111). He emphasized that when orally shaped
communication was first written down, "the device of script was
simply placed at the service of preserving visually what had already
been shaped for preservation orally" (1963: 136-37).
Prose conformed at first to the previous rules for the poetic (1963:
39). Even though the alphabet was destined to replace orality
by literacy, "the first historic task assigned to it was to
render an account of orality itself before it was replaced.
Since the replacement was slow, the invention continued to be used
to inscribe an orality which was slowly modifying itself in order to
become a language of literacy" (1986: 90). After Plato,
Havelock concluded, the balance of the tension between the oral and
literate mind-sets swung in favor of writing. The end of the
oral civilization marked the beginning of our own. "Plato,
living in the midst of this revolution, announced it and became its
prophet" (1963: vii).
[1]Eric
A. Havelock, The Muse Learns to Write (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 90. Havelock
elaborates his views in a series of works. See also his Preface
To Plato (Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1963); "Preliteracy and the Presocratics,"
Institute of Classical Studies Bulletin, No. 13 (1966):
44-67; "The Alphabetization of Homer," Communication
Arts in the Ancient World, eds., E. Havelock and P.
Hershbell (New York: Hastings House, 1978); The Literate
Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); and "The
Linguistic Task of the Presocratics," Language and
Thought in Early Greek Philosophy, ed., Kevin Robb (La
Salle, Illinois: Monist Library of Philosophy, 1983).
[2]Havelock,
Preface to Plato, pp. vii-xii. Here, he refers to
Harold Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic
Philosophy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935).