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Volodymyr
Kulyk
(Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Political and Ethnic
Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and Jacyk
Visiting Professor of Ukrainian Studies, Columbia University)
"External
Involvement in Ukrainian Ethnopolitical Conflicts: The Role
of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in the
De-escalation of the Crimean Tatar Problem"
On
November 1 as part of the Petro Jacyk Program for the Study
of Ukraine Seminar Series, Volodymyr Kulyk (Senior Research
Fellow at the Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies, National
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; Jacyk Visiting Professor of
Ukrainian Studies, Columbia University) spoke on "External
Involvement in Ukrainian Ethnopolitical Conflicts: The Role
of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in the
De-escalation of the Crimean Tatar Problem." In today's world,
the main sources of human loss are ethnic conflicts. Professor
Kulyk started his discussion by highlighting the important
role supra-state organizations and NGOs have undertaken in
the 20th and 21st centuries to limit excessive state power,
protect human rights, and facilitate economic cooperation.
Established
in 1975, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) has played a very important role in preventing
conflicts between the East and West blocs, and protecting
human rights. After the fall of communism in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, the organization turned its attention
toward preventing intra-state conflicts and promoting democracy
and human rights. The High Commissioner on National Minorities
was given authority to open dialogue between belligerents.
By 1992, the office of the High Commissioner was becoming
an instrument of conflict prevention and de-escalation of
conflict through a set of early warning/action prevention
policies. The High Commissioner became a legitimate actor
due to his confidentiality, impartiality, and independence
from governments. Between 1993 and 2001, the High Commissioner
dealt indepth with the situation of Tatars in the Crimean
Peninsula and Ukraine.
Professor
Kulyk gave a succinct yet complete presentation of the ethnic
conflict engulfing Crimea, the Tatars, and the Ukrainians.
The history goes back to 1921 when the Crimean Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic was formed within the RSFSR, with
Crimean Tatars representing 1/4 of the total population of
the ASSR. In 1944, Stalin persecuted and deported the Tatars
on the basis of their collaboration with the Germans during
WWII; the Crimean ASSR was abolished and in 1954 the area
came under the control of the Ukraine. Starting in the 1960s
but most prominently in 1989, the Crimean Tatars were allowed
to come back to their homeland. They were not welcomed back
by the predominant Russians and Ukrainians who had settled
in after the deportations and were afraid of losing their
houses and jobs if the Tatars were given back their properties.
A systematic policy of discrimination against the Tatars was
actively pursued, in which the Ukrainian leadership did not
grant the Tatars rights equal to those of the Russians and
Ukrainians; the Ukrainian authorities did nothing to prevent
this discrimination for fear of angering the Russian majority.
After
numerous clashes during 1992-1995, the OSCE organized a roundtable
to publicize and increase Western and Ukrainian awareness
of the situation of the Tatars returnees. The High Commissioner
raised four political issues: a) recognition of the Tatar
leadership (the Islamic Parliament Medjilis); b) recognition
of the Tatar language; c) Ukrainian citizenship to be given
to the Tatars; and d) representation of Tatars in the Ukrainian
government. The High Commissioner saw the recognition of the
Medjilis leadership as a symbolic de-escalation of the conflict,
but the Medjilis wanted their parliament to be a legislative,
not just a symbolic, body. In the 1995 Ukrainian constitution
they achieved the status of "indigenous people," but their
rights or who comprised an indigenous people were not specified.
The Tatar language was recognized as equal to Ukrainian and
Russian, but the only official language remained Russian;
in the 1998 Ukrainian constitution, Tatar was given the status
of a minority language. With regard to Ukrainian citizenship,
the 1998 constitution stipulated that only people who were
residing on Ukrainian territory in 1991 were to be given automatic
citizenship; however, the majority of Tatars came after that
year. As a result, 1/4 of Tatars were considered stateless
and 3/4 aliens. Most aliens were considered either Uzbeks
or Kazakhs, but in late 1997 the Ukrainian government concluded
an agreement with both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to allow
the Tatars to revoke their previous citizenship and obtain
the Ukrainian one. Finally, representation in the Ukrainian
government was illusory since language and citizenship issues
were significant obstacles. In the 1994 election, a quota
of 14 seats for the Tatars was imposed on the Ukrainian legislature.
The quota wwas abolished in the next election and the Tatars
have no representation at all in the Ukrainian Parliament.
This could signal the integration and incorporation of Tatars
into regional alliances.
Professor
Kulyk ended his presentation by outlining the main results
of the involvement of the High Commissioner in the Ukrainian-Tatar
conflict: financial assistance for the Tatar returnees; an
increased awareness among Ukrainians and the international
community of the plight of the Tatars, thus putting pressure
on the Ukrainian government and opening new channels of communication
(such as the Council of Europe); and the prevention of a full-fledged
civil war on the Crimean Peninsula. However, this peace came
with a high price at the expense of the Tatars, who find themselves
today caught up in a dilemma over national survival.
Alina
Darie, CREES
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