Participants:

Oleh Havrylyshyn (University of Toronto)

Jakob Hedenskog (Swedish Defense Research Agency and Petro Jacyk Visiting Fellow at CERES, University of Toronto)

Serhiy Kudelia (Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Petro Jacyk Post Doctoral Fellow, University of Toronto)

David Marples (University of Alberta)

Chair:

Lucan Way (University of Toronto)

Wednesday February 24, 2010 6pm-8pm

Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, University of Toronto

Introduction

This roundtable was the second in a two-part series analyzing the 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine. Following up on the November 20, 2009 discussion, where panelists made predictions and offered insights into the 2010 elections, this second roundtable discussion discussed the results of the election and their implications for the future, including Ukraine’s relations with the West and Russia.

Oleh Havrylyshyn started the discussion by pointing out that this election was important for Ukraine as the country now sits at a crossroads, poised between the European Union and Russia. Whether Viktor Yanukovich will be able to bridge the divide, as he has in fact promised to do in an op-ed he wrote for the Wall Street Journal, remains to be seen. Professor Havrylyshyn then proceeded to assess the election results, make a few short term predictions, and highlight key markers to watch for in the future.

In explaining the election results, Professor Havrylyshyn pointed to both the economic and non-economic factors at play. For example, non-economic explanations for the election of Yanukovich include his shift west toward a more democratic outlook, increased voter participation among his supporters, and reduced voter participation in Western Ukraine as a result of deep and bitter disappointment with the outcome of the Orange Revolution and Viktor Yushchenko.

In terms of economic factors, Professor Havrylyshyn suggested that although it may be tempting to assume that Yulia Tymoshenko would be blamed for the country’s poor economic performance and the suspension of the IMF since she was Prime Minister, there is in fact no compelling evidence for this. Conversely, in their reports the IMF blamed others more than Tymoshenko, and moreover, the economy wasn’t voters’ central concern. Rather, according to various blogs, voters’ were more concerned with Tymoshenko’s personality. Although the western media often refers to her as a populist, Professor Havrylyshyn nonetheless emphasized that this is a misleading label. Tymoshenko in fact lacked popularity, while Yanukovich was actually the more genuine populist.

In terms of predictions, professor Havrylyshyn began by suggesting that Yanukovich will claim an EU orientation, visiting Brussels before Moscow and being in favour of a possible future EU membership. Secondly, Yanukovich will ensure the IMF program is renewed. This shouldn’t be difficult, as long as unity in the government is met. Moreover, Yanukovich, if IMF agrees, would prefer to cancel the previous program and then launch a new one, thereby allowing him to announce that he will be bringing a larger amount, perhaps $10 billion to Ukraine. Finally, once a new Prime Minister is found, Tymoshenko will be removed from office and there will no longer be a constitutional problem of division of powers.

Over the long term, it will be interesting to see how the issue of the Russian base at Sevastopol plays out. If Russia agrees to sit down to talks it will be a good indication. Secondly, Yanukovich will likely implement a populist economic vision, allowing the oligarchs their continued dominance, while stunting future economic growth and weakening the economic outcome of the middle class. Finally, Ukraine will begin discussions on a single economic space and will have to tread carefully with the EU. The European Union may in fact like the idea of Ukraine as a “bridge” to Russia and choose to maintain that relationship instead of offering membership. Nevertheless, we could see Yanukovich pull a “Nixon to China” trick and manage to get Ukraine into Europe, beginning with offering a visa-free regime as a first meaningful symbol. As a final cautionary bottom line, Professor Havrylyshyn did remind the audience that imperialism is patient and we may well see Ukraine informally shift east, through what is not done with the west, such as joining NATO.

Jakob Hedenskog spoke next about how the election results will affect Ukraine’s relationship with the West and the EU in particular. He pointed out that this year’s results were very different from 2004 when the election was perceived as a dramatic choice between East and West. This time around, however, both front-runners wanted improved ties with Russia and there were not big differences between them in terms of ideology and prospects for future relations with the West.

Therefore, from the European Union’s perspective, these elections were largely met with indifference. The reason behind this indifference was the disappointment of the five years of Orange rule. The window of opportunity, opened by the Orange Revolution in 2004, had failed to materialize in a turning point in Ukraine’s EU integration.  Ukraine has made some progress, such as membership in the WTO, but nothing significant to bring it closer to EU membership. Ukraine’s European policy had often been unrealistic and characterized by excessive expectations.  The country’s political elites had showed little understanding of the economic and political changes required to meet membership criteria. Instead, they were focused on image building for the domestic political scene. Ukraine’s failure to understand EU mechanisms and operations, and the inability to fight corruption, deal with bureaucracy, etc. hampers the possibility of membership.

The EU does not expect Yanukovich to bring changes other than perhaps more stability and a more realistic approach towards the EU. By visiting Brussels before Moscow Yanukovich wanted to demonstrate his foreign policy priorities and help dispel his image as a Kremlin stooge and Soviet apparatchik in Brussels. For Ukraine, visa-free travel, or at least a road map for visa-free travel is high on wishlist, but for Europe, the priority right now with Ukraine is energy and for Ukraine to keep its promise to modernize the gas transport system.

Serhiy Kudelia began by asking how Ukraine in 2010 is different from Ukraine in 2004. He suggested the general notion, although somewhat misleading, is that Ukraine is still divided. In 2004 both Yanukovich and Yushchenko received around 39% of the vote, but this time around Yanukovich beat Tymoshenko by 10%, meaning that polarization was much smaller. Ukraine today is more politically diverse, with more candidates. For example, the third and fourth place contenders received together 20% .

Professor Kudelia then showed a map picturing the paired results after round one of the vote. The map, comparing 2010 and 2004 results, showed that Yanukovich won by capturing new votes among the previous orange electorate. In other words, he made gains in former Yushchenko areas, which totaled around 800 000 new votes. Despite these obvious gains it nevertheless remains a mystery as to how Yanukovich accomplished this. Did people vote against Tymoshenko or were they drawn to Yanukovich? The map also showed that for the most part, Tymoshenko lost “Orange” voters, who supported Yushchenko in 2004, all over Ukraine.

In considering the election results, Professor Kudelia pointed out the positive outcomes. First of all, there was no regional standoff after the election. There were no attempts to organize protests or declarations by nationalist city councils anywhere in the west. In fact, right before the second round Lviv city government announced that it was going to default on its loans as a result of not receiving money from the central government. This emphasis on the economy was bad for Tymoshenko as she shouldered the blame. Another positive outcome was that the international community recognized the results and that there were no issues with the election observation. For Yanukovich, the positive outcome is that even his supporters have low expectations for him. This should be viewed as positive, as it shows that everyone is skeptical. Hopefully there will thus be less apathy and disillusionment in the future.

Regarding the negative aspects, the first thing Professor Kudelia emphasized was the fact that Tymoshenko did not recognize the election results. This undermines people’s confidence in the democratic process in Ukraine and the credibility of the international election observers. Moreover, Tymoshenko’s accusations of fraud tarnish the legacy of the Orange Revolution, which centered on people’s right to have their votes counted fairly and to have the President elected by the majority of votes. Another negative effect of the election is that the Party of Regions changed election rules right before the election creating a bad precedent for the future. Finally, the political elite is now divided on the legitimacy of the new President, with Tymoshenko’s bloc becoming a “disloyal opposition”, which may harm democracy and stability of the country..

Now that Yanukovich has assumed power, he faces the dilemma of having to implement his promises, 90% of which can only come from the government. The constitutional changes he supported remove his ability to take over the government and do as he pleases. If Yanukovich can create a majority in parliament he has three options. First of all, he could decide to spend his time hunting and golfing while delegating power to the oligarchs to run the government. This would mean increased corruption and the erosion of his presidential powers. Secondly, Yanukovich could consolidate power, as Putin did, appoint a loyal Prime Minister, and try to bargain with the oligarchs. This, however, is unlikely as it is questionable whether Yanukovich actually has sufficient leverage to do this. The third option would be for Yanukovich to share power with the oligarchs. This would mean that they could keep control of the gas trade and privatize remaining assets, but this could also lead to future conflict if agreements are violated.

In conclusion, Professor Kudelia suggested that if the new parliamentary elections are announced, Tymoshenko will continue as Prime Minister, which means further stand-off and policy-making paralysis. Still, election may bring new political forces into the parliament, thus paving the way for new elites to ultimately emerge.

David Marples was the last speaker of the evening. He focused on Ukraine’s relations with Russia and began his talk with Russia’s attitudes toward Ukraine. He suggested that Russia today sees Ukraine as an artificial state. The Russian government stresses the common ancestry of Russians and Ukrainians and expresses the hope for one state and a single Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

Professor Marples discussed how Medvedev sent a letter to Yushchenko accusing him of restricting Russia’s movement of the Black Sea Fleet, how he has expressed anger over the repression of the Russian language in Ukraine and has condemned the country for flirting with NATO. This culminated with Russian diplomats being expelled from Ukraine.

The 2010 elections were different from 2004 in that Russia did not attempt to interfere or promote one candidate. As long as Yushchenko was out of the picture, Russia was happy with either Yanukovich or Tymoshenko, although there was an assumption that Yanukovich was more pliable and more consistently pro Russian. To Russia, Professor Marples pointed out, Ukraine is seen as a missing link in their policy of the near abroad.

As far as the future goes, Professor Marples suggested that it will be interesting to see whether Yanukovich’s inauguration will be presided over by the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church as it will be a symbol of perhaps Ukraine returning to Russia’ sphere of influence. Furthermore, in 2017 the lease will expire in Sevastopol and Yanukovich will need the support of the parliament to renew the lease. Meanwhile, Russia is working on building a new base on the Black Sea just in case, however there is uncertainty as to what would happen if in fact Russia was told to move, but didn’t. In order to have the move completed by 2017, Russia would need to begin moving by 2014. This whole situation brings into question how Ukraine will guarantee its security now and into the future.

Question and Answer Session

Following the roundtable discussion the audience was invited to ask questions.

Question #1)

Can you comment on the fact that there was nothing serious said about the election fraud. Tymoshenko was not allowed to see the evidence of fraud. Isn’t this a stain on the legacy of the Orange Revolution?

Answer: (Serhiy Kudelia) Tymoshenko’s presentation of arguments suggesting there was election fraud seems more politically motivated. She argued that voting at home and registration on voting day were both illegal. Although there could have been some election fraud, she never presented compelling evidence to prove it was systemic and nationwide.

Question #2)

What are Tymoshenko’s long term prospects?

Answer: (Serhiy Kudelia) Skeptical of her future. Tymoshenko did not get endorsements from the third or fourth place candidates. She is viewed as someone who is unwilling to share power or delegate and this makes it unlikely that others will want to make a coalition with her.

Question #3)

Ukraine has veto power over Russia’s entry into the WTO and it’s surprising that they haven’t used it as a trump card. What’s going on?

Answer: (Oleh Havrylyshyn) Russia asked to have their process of becoming a member of the WTO delayed while Yushchenko was president, as they waited for him to leave office. Russia was afraid that Ukraine would delay their membership, which would have looked bad. Ukraine will now have to make it clear to Russia that they have no objections to Russia joining the WTO.

Question #4)

What kinds of reforms does Ukraine need at this point? Can you discuss the IMF loans?

Answer: (Oleh Havrylyshyn) The IMF issue needs to be revisited. Ukraine’s financial position has changed. The recession talk was alarmist and Ukraine’s exports of metallurgical products are going up. Ultimately though, none of the World Bank money will make a huge difference; $10 Billion isn’t a lot of money. It is more of a signal that Ukraine needs to get its house in order.

Question #5)

To what extent is Yanukovich going to make his own decisions versus the oligarchs? What is the self interest of the oligarchs in terms of Ukraine’s relations with the east/west and do they prefer chaos in the economy?

Answer: (David Marples) The oligarchs want to be left alone to continue their business interests without interference. In terms of choosing between east and west, they would like to keep all their options open. They do like being in parliament, however, where they get parliamentary immunity.

(Oleh Havrylyshyn) The oligarchs don’t want to rejoin Russia where they would just be small fish in a big pond, but they’re not keen on the EU either, as they are used to working behind the scenes with a government that helps them to avoid competition. Europe would make them play by the rules. The oligarchs want to keep their hands in politics in Ukraine in order to manipulate policy and ensure the rules do not impede them. All in all they prefer the idea of a neutral Ukraine so that they can maintain stability and avoid Europe’s competition rules.

(Serhiy Kudelia) The oligarchs don’t have the same interests as Russia They want a review of the gas agreement and increased transit prices.

(Lucan Way) Ukraine needs to stop beating itself up over EU membership. The problem lies with Europe, not Ukraine. Ukraine is in no worse a position than other EU members, but membership is really more about geography and security. Ukraine is just too large a country and this is not something that Ukraine can fix.

(Oleh Havrylyshyn) In regards to the issue of EU membership, it would be an error for Ukraine to forget about it. The EU may get over enlargement fatigue and if they accept Turkey, they won’t be able to reject Ukraine.

Question #6)

Over the last five years Ukraine has become more democratic. What will happen now?

Answer: (Serhiy Kudelia) When it comes to the media, some pessimism is in order. If Yanukovich gives the oligarchs what they want, the media scene in Ukraine will begin to look more like Russia where channels are just focused around a single candidate. Also, the attitudes of Ukrainian journalists today demonstrate that they are more willing to sell out; it has become a new norm. This is a big difference between now and 2004.

(David Marples) The Internet is a reason to be less pessimistic about the media in Ukraine. It is much tougher to control the Internet.

Question #7)

Why is polarization a problem? Is it really all that different from polarization in the United States?

Answer: (Lucan Way) The level of polarization in the US is much less. Polarization in Ukraine is the highest in the world. Both candidates were very similar, both embraced Putin, and yet the vote was still so polarized. Tymoshenko’s actions in refusing to accept the election results are very dangerous because she is setting a precedent for the loser of an election to always call an election a fraud. This just delegitimizes the whole process.