France, Britain and Germany informed Ukraine in a letter on January 7 that they will take a neutral stand in the country’s upcoming presidential election.

French Secretary of State for European Affairs Pierre Lellouche and British Minister for Europe Chris Bryant told a joint press conference they had reached an agreement with German State Minister of Foreign Affairs Werner Hoyer to take an impartial position toward candidates in the election. The ministers instead declared their support for Ukraine to hold democratic elections and accelerate economic reforms, adding that they also hoped for an improvement in Ukraine-Russia relations. The three countries will cooperate on the issue, Lellouche said, because the situation in Ukraine concerns the stability of Europe. (Xinhua, January 7, 2010)

Such statements from influential Western countries are nothing unusual. The U.S. also issued a similar statement both in 2004 and recently for the 2010 elections. This rhetoric may be a sign that the EU recognizes the different nature of the current presidential contest: there is no clear-cut pro-Western candidate among the front-runners. By publicly abstaining, the Western countries show they are less than thrilled about any of the leading candidates.

The West’s neutrality can be interpreted as a sign of growing “Ukraine fatigue” in Europe and the U.S. In the five years since the Orange Revolution, Ukraine failed to deliver on high expectations for reforms, and now the West seems to doubt a new Ukrainian president will effect any real political change.

The distinction from the 2004 presidential elections is striking. Though in 2004 the Western actors did not support any particular candidate, it was clear they preferred a victory by Yushchenko, who was perceived as a harbinger of democratic values, over Yanukovych, who was associated with authoritarianism and corruption and was Russia’s preferred choice. Nevertheless, these subtle divisions had an impact on the behaviour of many Westerners involved in the election, from politicians to journalists, and even election observers.

Among the Western actors in 2004, the U.S. was the most active contributor to international efforts in Ukraine in terms of consistency, allocated assistance, and readiness to implement radical measures if democracy failed. The European Union, however, had two different faces: a western European bloc, with a more moderate approach and which became truly active only during the election and the Orange Revolution; and a central European bloc, which was proactive from the very beginning and gradually persuaded the Western states to join the bandwagon. 

Many prominent American politicians such as Madeleine Albright, George H.W. Bush, Richard Holbrook, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Wesley Clark visited Ukraine in 2004 and stressed the international relevance of the Ukrainian elections by highlighting the importance of a free and fair election process. Statements from the U.S. Congress, the German Bundestag, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, and the Polish Sejm did the same.

Among the European countries, Poland went the furthest in expressing its support for the opposition during the elections, although not as blatantly as the Kremlin’s nod for Yanukovych. In an article published in the International Herald Tribune on September 2, 2004, Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski said “the EU has fallen short of offering any incentives to the opposition in Ukraine.” During an official visit to Kyiv on November 12, 2004, then Polish Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz snubbed the incumbents: instead of meeting with Prime Minister Yanukovych and President Kuchma as originally planned, he met only with Yushchenko and parliament Chair Volodymyr Lytvyn.

Mediation efforts in 2004 by Kwasnewski and Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, as well as European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, OSCE Secretary Jan Kubis and Russian Parliamentary Speaker Boris Gryzlov, encouraged the opposition. (Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough (eds. Anders Åslund & Michael McFaul) (2006), pp 131, 133, 141).

This year, the West’s sympathies toward the candidates have been virtually nonexistent. One exception, however, was the support declared last month by the European People’s Party’s (EPP) Congress’ for Tymoshenko (see post on Dec. 18 2009), which was publicized by her press service. The joint statement by France, Britain and Germany may have been designed to neutralize the EPP’s statement.

Disengagement, however, can also be seen as a good sign. While both Russia and the West will be much less active in these elections, the Ukrainians will meanwhile be given the chance to largely run their own show and participate in an election without blatant interference from outside powers. But it is unclear whether the neutrality from Russia and the West will continue if reports of fraud arise and the result is contested from any of the leading candidates.