Five years ago Ukraine’s parliament adopted the constitutional amendments, which transformed Kuchma’s strongly centralized presidential system into a semi-presidential regime with several competing centers of power. The driving force behind this change was Viktor Medvedchuk, then the chief of the Presidential Administration. For years since the Orange Revolution Medvedchuk has been out of power and, at least publicly, out of politics. His today’s op-ed in the Ukrainian weekly “Korrespondent” may mark the end of his self-imposed exile and the first open declaration of the need to restore authoritarianism in Ukraine.

“I Don’t Want Such a Democracy”

In his article Medvedchuk does something that politicians rarely dare to – he acknowledges that he made a major mistake. The political process under the amended Constitution reminds him of a performance in a provincial theater, which combines “legal nihilism and pseudo-democracy.” He views it as a far cry from European-style democracy, which Medvedchuk supposedly wanted to achieve with his constitutional amendments that he drafted and vigorously tried to push through the parliament in 2002-2004.

Back then the democratic opposition viewed Medvedchuk’s constitutional reform as a devious plan to leave Yushchenko without any substantial power once he gets elected president. In fact, it was an attempt by a group of oligarchs to minimize their dependence on any future president, much like the large wealth holders in XVII century England wanted to strengthen the parliament in order to limit the arbitrary powers of the Crown (see North and Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment,” Journal of Economic History, December 1989). Since they expected the parliament to be controlled by several oligarchic quasi-parties, making the government accountable to the parliament rather than the president would ensure both the safety and the continued privileges for their businesses.

In this, Ukrainian oligarchs actually succeeded. All of them secured most of their assets after the Orange Revolution and continued to thrive under the new authorities. The post-revolutionary governments, led alternatively by Yanukovych and Tymoshenko, provided their oligarchic sponsors with state support and special treatment, while the president became almost irrelevant for the distribution of rents and business deals.

Medvedchuk’s brain-child, however, failed to reward its own creator. His once powerful political party – United Social-Democrats – was completely marginalized after losing access to administrative and financial resources of the state. Having failed dismally in 2006 parliamentary election, the party virtually ceased to exist, while Medvedhcuk disappeared from public politics. His re-emergence on a public scene after more than three years comes with the emphatic declaration: “I don’t want such a democracy! Not for myself, and not for my children!” A long-time advocate of a parliamentary system Medvedchuk now says that he wants to “take my words back.”

Medvedchuk advertises his new plan for the country as not based on a new leader or an ideology, but on a quite “primitive” scenario, which would “guarantee law and order.” This scenario, according to Medvedchuk, involves returning to the earlier political system with a strong president who would “rely on a majority in the parliament and form the executive.” In other words, he wants the president to regain the power of appointing the Prime Minister and the full cabinet, as well as heads of other state agencies.

However, Medvedchuk’s proposal goes much further than just advocating restoration of former presidential powers since for most of his presidency Kuchma did not have a pro-presidential majority in the parliament. This, in fact, allowed Rada to remain a place for genuine political contestation and a check, albeit a weak one, on the executive. Medvedchuk’s emphasis on the need for a president to rely on a loyal majority in the parliament means that the president’s new powers would include dissolving any parliament where the opposition prevails. Much like the president of Russia has the power to dissolve the Duma if it does not the support the government.

So Medvedchuk’s plan involves not just a return to competitive authoritarian regime of the Kuchma era, but the creation of a legal basis for a full-fledged authoritarian regime. 

Who Can Implement Medvedchuk’s Plan?

Both frontrunners of the presidential election – Tymoshenko and Yanukovych – speak in favor of constitutional changes and earlier advocated introducing a purely parliamentary system. However, since “what one says depends on where one seats”, either of them would change their preferences once winning a president’s office. Still, Yanukovych’s room for new constitutional maneuvers would be more limited than Tymoshenko’s. After all, he leads a party with diverse and powerful interests, where Akhmetov’s business wing would be interested in preserving autonomy over the decision-making by controlling key parts of the government. Thus, there will be a substantial resistance within the party if Yanukovych tries to centralize power and subordinate everyone to himself.

By contrast, Tymoshenko’s party is already strongly hierarchical and excludes any possibility of autonomous factions within it. It is also a leader-driven organization with Tymoshenko’s personality cult becoming a party norm. Thus, re-centralization of power is something Tymoshenko would support and most likely be able to implement successfully. Medvedchuk’s emphasis on “law and order” echoes her recent speeches, where she pledged to build a “tangible and appealing order.” Moreover, according to numerous reports, Medvedchuk has been Tymoshenko’s long-time behind-the-scenes advisor helping her to establish closer ties with the Kremlin and serving as a chief mediator during negotiations with Yanukovych.

So, having failed to gain power through open political competition, Medvedchuk now tries to restore his political influence by betting on an aspiring autocrat willing to implement his new political scheme. The Orange Revolution failed to stop him last time. What will now?