

Racial Inequality, Social Cohesion and Policy Issues in Canada

IMMIGRATION HAS SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED THE RACIAL DIVERSITY OF THE CANADIAN population. Since the 1960s, when discriminatory selection policies were eliminated, questions about immigration's impact on the cohesiveness of Canadian society have become more prominent. Although few predict a breakdown in social cohesion as a result of racial diversity, concerns about racial tensions have been expressed from a variety of political standpoints by a number of commentators, including advocates for minority rights (Lewis 1992; Omidvar and Richmond 2003) and advocates of reductions in immigration (Economic Council of Canada 1991; Stoffman 2002; Collacott 2002; Francis 2002). In this chapter, we review some research findings specifically related to racial inequality and discrimination in Canada as well as to the social integration of racial minorities in Canadian society; we then examine the relation between the two. Our review suggests that racial inequality is a significant issue in Canada, and that the extent of discrimination is a point of dispute between racial groups. This creates a potentially significant racial divide and prompts us to ask whether existing policy responses are adequate to bridge the gap.

The shift toward non-European sources of immigrants to Canada after the late 1960s was marked. Immigrants arriving before 1970 were overwhelmingly from Europe, and in the 1950s and 1960s, many came from southern and Eastern Europe, as well as northern Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States. Of those arriving in the 1960s or before, only 10.2 percent were racial or visible minorities (based on 2001 Census data). However, this figure rises dramatically to 51.8 percent for 1970s arrivals, 65.4 percent for 1980s arrivals and nearly 75 percent for 1990s arrivals. As a result, racial or visible minorities have grown from constituting less

than 1 percent of the population in 1971 to 13.4 percent in 2001. The largest groups are Chinese (3.4 percent), South Asians (3.1 percent) and Blacks (2.2 percent).

The increasing impact of racial diversity in Canada is magnified because of the concentration of minorities in certain immigrant-intensive cities, especially Toronto and Vancouver. In the Toronto Metropolitan Area, racial minorities constituted only about 3 percent of the total population of 2.6 million in 1971, but by 2001 the figure had grown to 36.8 percent of 4.6 million. A recent Statistics Canada study has projected that by 2017, when racial minorities will make up 20 percent of the Canadian population, both Toronto and Vancouver will likely be “majority-minority” cities (Statistics Canada 2005b; see also Kalbach et al. 1993).¹

Ethnoracial diversity may adversely affect a society’s cohesiveness in two ways. When diversity results in inequality, it may undermine the sense of fairness and inclusion among individuals and groups. Racial diversity may also weaken the commonality of values, commitments and social relations among individuals and groups, thereby affecting their capacity to cooperate in the pursuit of common objectives. Each dimension is important in its own right, and they may have a combined effect on social cohesion.

Given the long history of ethnic and linguistic diversity in the Canadian population, both issues have always been of great significance. However, in many countries, breakdowns in interracial relations have most often been seen as linked to the former — racial inequality and discrimination. Witness the United States in the 1960s (Kerner Commission 1968) or Britain in the 1980s (Scarman 1986). And in Canada in recent years, responses to increasing racial diversity have gradually shifted; more attention is being paid to equality issues than to cultural commonalities. For example, although equality has always been an objective of Canada’s multiculturalism initiative, it was sought initially through an emphasis on culture — specifically, recognition of the cultural contribution of various ethnic groups and the promise of government support for culture. This was intended to help break down barriers to equal participation in society (as Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau suggested in his speech announcing the policy [Canada, House of Commons 1971, 8545-6]). But since the 1980s, multiculturalism has included an explicit antiracism component. Racial equality is now a focus of other policies, as well, such as the federal employment equity policy adopted in 1986.

In this chapter, we examine evidence of racial inequality and discrimination and consider their relation to the social integration of racial minorities in Canada. In doing so, we have used very helpful data from Statistics Canada’s landmark Ethnic Diversity

Survey (EDS).² The survey, conducted in 2002, is the best source of information on the social integration of minorities yet produced in Canada, partly because its primary focus is on intergroup relations. The survey's large sample permits analysis of specific minority groups and of the emerging Canadian-born generation of minorities.

The analyses we present in this chapter distinguish recent immigrants, immigrants with longer experience in Canada and the children of immigrants — the so-called second generation. Most racial minorities in Canada are immigrants, but a born-in-Canada generation is emerging: by 2001, it constituted 29.4 percent of the racial minority population. As the children of relatively recent immigrants, most of these Canadian-born members of racial minorities are young: 63.3 percent are under 16; only 16.2 percent are over 25. Still, because they constitute an emerging young adult population with a perspective that differs from that of immigrants, this second generation is critical to an assessment of the long-term impact of immigration (Boyd 2000; Reitz and Somerville 2004). On the one hand, as Canadian-born, they will not confront many of the obstacles their parents faced as arriving immigrants. On the other hand, their expectation of social acceptance, economic opportunity and equal participation may be greater than that of their parents.

An analysis of the existing literature and EDS findings indicates that racial minority immigrants integrate into Canadian society relatively slowly, and that discriminatory inequalities are at least part of the reason.³ This prompts a consideration of existing Canadian policies on racial inequality and their adequacy to address this challenge to the cohesiveness of Canadian society.

R a c i a l I n e q u a l i t i e s a n d D i s c r i m i n a t i o n

IN THE FOLLOWING SECTION, WE DESCRIBE THE OVERALL ECONOMIC SITUATION OF racial minorities in Canada, including employment earnings and the trend toward lower earnings for recent immigrants. We go on to review evidence of perceptions of inequality and discrimination in different segments of the population.

Overall economic situation and employment of racial minorities

Generally speaking, visible minorities have much lower relative household incomes and higher poverty rates than do ethnic groups of European origin

(Kazemipur and Halli 2001, 2000, 107-9; Ornstein 2000; Reitz and Banerjee 2005). Data from the EDS (table 1, column 1) show mean individual-equivalent household incomes for ethnic groups,⁴ relative to the mean for the census metropolitan area of residence. For visible minorities, the incomes are \$7,686 less than the local average, while for Whites, they are \$1,895 above the local average; thus, the gap is \$9,581. In relation to the national mean individual-equivalent household income of \$41,330, this gap is 23.2 percent. Relative household incomes of virtually all racial minority groups — including Chinese, South Asians and Blacks, as the largest groups — are substantially lower than those of almost all White groups (for further details, see Reitz and Banerjee 2005).⁵ In 2001, the poverty rate for racial minorities was nearly double that for the rest of the population (table 1, column 2, from census data):⁶ 26.6 percent compared with 14.2 percent; some racial minorities had higher rates than others.⁷ White immigrant groups experience inequality as well, but not nearly to the same extent.

The main economic problem for new racial minority immigrants is, of course, finding adequate employment (Li 2000). There are a number of reasons they experience difficulties in doing so. Some of these difficulties — but by no means all — are associated with the period of adjustment or “entry effect” that all immigrants must confront. Entry problems may be particularly severe for immigrants arriving during a recession, as was the case for many in the early 1990s. Experience shows that all immigrants do better as they settle in and become more accustomed to their new environment. Furthermore, adverse experiences linked to economic recession may be offset by a later rebound in the economy, as the immigrants who arrived in the early 1980s discovered (Bloom, Grenier, and Gunderson 1995; Grant 1999). In short, economic disadvantage and high rates of poverty may attenuate over time, and the entry effect will disappear.

There are a number of other reasons for immigrants’ employment difficulties.⁸ Perhaps the most important are urban settlement, the discounting of qualifications, and race. With respect to the first reason, in seeking employment, immigrants find that any educational advantage they might have due to Canada’s skill-selective immigration policy is offset by the fact that most settle in major urban areas where jobs are plentiful but competition is intense from new native-born labour market entrants, who tend to be young and also highly educated (Reitz 2004b). In terms of the second reason, immigrants’ skills tend to be discounted in the labour market, while those of the native-born are not (Reitz

Objective and Perceived Ethnoracial Inequality in Canada, by Ancestry

	IE income (mean \$) ¹	Poverty rate (%) ²	Perceived discrimination (%)	Perceived vulnerability (%)	N
<i>Nonvisible minorities (by ancestry)³</i>					
Canadian	1,258.7	16.4	10.7	14.3	10,293
French	750.5	16.6	9.1	19.2	592
British	3,386.1	11.8	10.7	15.0	1,744
Northern and Western European	2,238.2	12.5	10.0	11.2	4,356
Russian and Eastern European	405.7	16.2	12.5	16.5	299
Other Southern European	-2,778.6	14.3†	14.7	16.8	2,098
Jewish	11,637.7	13.3†	20.0	38.7	276
Arab and West Asian	-6,058.4	29.2	18.9	21.2	125
Latin American	-7,416.6	25.1	24.2	23.8	5,893
Greek	-617.4	16.3†	13.6	15.6	291
Italian	1,278.0	12.2†	11.5	19.2	207
Portuguese	-5,832.7	12.8†	8.9	15.9	568
Other European	9,453.1	12.5	16.2	16.0	4,109
Total nonvisible minorities	1,895.3	14.2	10.6	16.0	30,851
<i>Visible minorities (all ancestries)</i>					
Chinese	-6,730.2	26.9	33.2	33.6	513
South Asian	-5,815.8	21.7	33.1	38.7	1,424
Black	-10,607.2	31.1	49.6	43.0	2,421
Filipino	-5,063.5	16.4†	35.8	48.8	653
Latin American	-10,270.3	29.3	28.6	30.0	362
Southeast Asian	-6,829.3	25.6	34.5	37.7	148
Arab and West Asian	-13,359.4	40.8	29.8	27.0	386
Korean	-17,145.0	40.8†	40.5	49.0	209
Japanese	4,079.5	n/a	42.8	34.2	1,892
Other visible minorities	-7,114.5	23.7	33.3	36.8	331
Multiple visible minorities	-4,304.2	n/a	41.5	28.7	283
Total visible minorities	-7,686.4	26.6	35.9	37.3	8,622
Total					39,473

Source: *Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2003).

¹ Individual-equivalent household income, relative to the census metropolitan area (CMA) mean. The individual-equivalent income adjusts household incomes for household size, and is calculated by dividing household income by the square root of household size.

² Data on poverty rates are from the 2001 Census Public Use Microdata File, 2.7 percent sample, for people aged 15 and over, and are based on Statistics Canada's low-income cutoff. In those data, visible minorities are identified only as Black, South Asian, Chinese, and other visible minorities. In this table, "other visible minorities" are further identified as Filipino, Latin American, Southeast Asian, Arab and West Asian, and Korean, based on ancestry.

³ The origins of the groups in the "nonvisible minorities" category include Arab, West Asian and Latin American, and these also appear in the "visible minorities" group. Those who are considered in the "nonvisible minorities" category described themselves as White in the visible minority question. Those who did not identify any ancestry or visible minority group or did not report household income or perceived inequality were excluded.

† Data exclude Maritime provinces.

2001a; Li 2001); as for the third reason, racial minority immigrants face more obstacles than immigrants of European origin or native-born workers (Pendakur and Pendakur 1998, 2002). Other possible reasons for employment difficulties include isolation in minority occupational enclaves and the fact that minority group social networks lack the linkages necessary to find good jobs.

The obstacles to immigrant success appear to have increased, and the greatest impact has been felt by those arriving most recently, even though the late 1990s and early 2000s were a period of strong labour demand. In fact, underlying the ups and downs of several business cycles, there has been a downward trend in the employment rates and earnings of successive cohorts of newly arrived immigrants, both male and female (Frenette and Morissette 2003; see also Baker and Benjamin 1994; Reitz 2001b).⁹ Whereas immigrant men arriving in the five-year period before the 1981 Census earned 79.6 percent of the earnings of native-born men, by 1996 this figure had dropped to 60 percent. For women, it dropped from 73.1 percent to 62.4 percent. By 2001, as a result of the improved labour demand of the late 1990s, relative earnings for the most recently arrived immigrants were higher than they had been in the mid-1990s, but they remained about 15 percentage points below 1970 levels (Frenette and Morissette 2003, 7). Notably, despite earnings mobility experienced by immigrants as their time in Canada increases, the general trend toward declining earnings also affects immigrants who have been in Canada longer.

New immigrants have seen reduced employment success even though immigrant education levels are at an all-time high (Frenette and Morissette 2003; see also Statistics Canada 2003; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 1998). Marc Frenette and René Morissette show that the proportion of immigrant men arriving in the late 1990s who possessed at least the equivalent of a bachelor's degree was over 40 percent, more than twice the figure of 18.6 for native-born Canadian men; the corresponding figures for women were 37.5 percent and 21.7 percent (2003, 4). Yet, as we have mentioned, this has not translated into employment success. Overall, these downward trends in employment have resulted in higher poverty rates and reduced standards of living (Picot and Hou 2003).¹⁰

Only some of the reasons for these trends are well understood.¹¹ The shift toward immigrants originating from outside Europe, with the resulting change in the racial composition of immigration, explains some of the reduced employment success, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Abdurrahman Aydemir and

Mikal Skuterud show that when we consider immigrant trends throughout the period following the policy changes of the 1960s focusing on earnings in relation to levels of education, we see that the decline in earnings to 2000 is as much as 50 percent for both men and women (2005, 648-9). As much as one-third of this decline stems from origin shifts and the disadvantages associated with racial minority status.¹²

Broader labour market changes affect immigrants, as well — particularly racial minorities. David Green and Christopher Worswick have shown that, to some extent, the downward trend in immigrant employment parallels the trend among the native-born entering the workforce for the first time, in the sense that both groups fared worse in the 1990s than in earlier decades (2004). While the causes of the trend may or may not be the same for immigrants and the native-born, the consequences are greater for immigrants, since a larger proportion are pushed into poverty, and racial minorities are disproportionately affected.

Increased difficulties for immigrants may also be related to the move toward a knowledge economy, the transformation of the occupational structure and an overall increase in earnings inequality. One aspect of this is the rise in native-born education levels, which, since the 1970s, has been generally faster than the rise in immigrant education levels. Reitz shows that the discounting of the foreign-acquired education of immigrants in the labour market compounds their difficulties in keeping pace (2001b). Furthermore, the increased earnings disadvantages of immigrants are related to their reduced access to professional-level employment (Reitz 2003b), and to their growing difficulty in obtaining well-paying jobs outside professional fields, where educational qualifications are becoming more important. Finally, there is a noticeable decline in the value of foreign experience in the labour market, though the origins of this decline are not yet known (Green and Worswick 2004; Aydemir and Skuterud 2005; Reitz 2006).

In addition, the economic situation of immigrants may be affected by broader institutional changes in Canadian society (Reitz 1998). Specifically, social services have been reduced, affecting immigrants who are in the early stages of settlement, and costs for public services are rising, including costs for retraining and educational upgrading.

Clearly, the racial dimension of economic inequality in Canada today is significant, and its social implications require scrutiny. In any society, a noticeable association of racial status and economic success over extended periods raises

questions about social and political integration. A critical aspect of this, which we will now consider, is the significance of discriminatory treatment.

Perceptions of racial prejudice and discrimination: A racial divide?

The fact that immigrants experience inequality and disadvantage may not in itself be divisive if it is regarded as the result of understandable circumstances — such as newcomer status, lack of sufficient language skills or training that does not match Canadian job requirements. Simply stated, inequality may not become a social problem if it is perceived as legitimate. However, racism, prejudice and discrimination are another matter. Not surprisingly, discriminatory treatment is more likely to be perceived as unjust and to lead to serious intergroup antagonism, as Gunnar Myrdal has noted. In his classic — and prescient — examination of US racial inequality, Myrdal points out the significance of the contradiction between the ideal of equal opportunity and the reality of inequality reinforced by discrimination (1944).

But how significant is racial discrimination in Canada? To what extent does it affect access to employment, education or housing? Let us begin by considering the way this problem is perceived in Canadian society. Within certain minority groups, perceptions of racial discrimination are fairly widespread. In the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey, which includes reports of personal experiences of racial and ethnic discrimination, respondents were asked, “In the past 5 years [or, for more recent immigrants, since arriving in Canada], do you feel that you have experienced discrimination or been treated unfairly by others in Canada because of your ethnicity, race, skin colour, language, accent, or religion?” To capture perceptions of vulnerability to discrimination, two other questions were asked. The first concerned the respondent feeling “uncomfortable or out of place in Canada” because of race or cultural background;¹³ the second concerned the respondent worrying about becoming a victim of a hate crime.¹⁴ Respondents who felt uncomfortable or out of place at least some of the time, or who were at least somewhat worried about being a victim of a hate crime, are considered to have felt vulnerable to discrimination based on race or cultural background.

As table 1 shows, of the members of visible minorities who responded to this survey, 35.9 percent reported experiences of discrimination, compared with 10.6 percent of Whites (see p. 5). The highest rate is for Blacks, at 49.6 percent, but there are substantial rates also for the other visible minority groups, includ-

ing Chinese, at 33.2 percent, and South Asians, at 33.1 percent. Among most White groups, experiences of discrimination are reported by fewer than 15 percent.¹⁵ Experiences of perceived vulnerability are reported by 37.3 percent of visible minority groups and 16 percent of White groups. These are personal experiences, and the EDS does not report perceptions of discrimination against the group as a whole. However, earlier surveys indicate that individuals are even more likely to perceive discrimination against their group as a whole than against themselves personally: over one-third of Chinese respondents felt that way, as did a clear majority of Black ones.¹⁶

Despite improvement in the economic circumstances of immigrants as they adjust to Canadian society and labour markets and the generally more positive employment experiences of the second generation, a racial gap in perception of discrimination is notable among immigrants with longer experience in Canada. This gap is even greater among the children of immigrants. Data from the EDS, reported in table 2, show that among recent immigrants (those arriving during the previous 10 years), 33.6 percent of racial minorities report having experienced discrimination, compared with 19.2 percent of those of European origin. Among immigrants arriving earlier, perceptions of discrimination are less common for those of European origin; at a rate of 10.2 percent, it is about the same as it is for the children of European immigrants and for the broader Canadian population of third generation and greater. But among racial minority immigrants who arrived earlier, perceptions of discrimination are, if anything, more common, at 35.5 percent; and among the children of racial minority immigrants, the percentage experiencing discrimination is still greater, at 42.2 percent. The racial gap in perceptions of discrimination, which is 14.4 percent for recent immigrants, is 25.3 percent for earlier immigrants, and 31.3 percent for the children of immigrants. In other words, greater experience in Canada seems to lead to a larger racial gap in the perception of discrimination. This widening racial gap is observed among Chinese, South Asians, Blacks and other visible minority groups. In these groups, the percentage of those born in Canada who report experiences of discrimination varies between 34.5 percent for Chinese, 43.4 percent for South Asians and 60.9 percent for Blacks, compared with 10.9 percent for the children of immigrants of European origin.

Members of minority groups also express serious concerns about the non-recognition of immigrant qualifications. In some cases, the educational qualifica-

Objective and Perceived Inequality by Origin, Immigration Cohort and Generation, 2002

	Immigrants		Second generation ³	Third generation and higher ⁴
	Recent ¹	Earlier ²		
<i>IE income (mean \$)⁵</i>				
White	-8,467.5	2,190.6	3,497.2	3,656.7
All visible minorities	-14,630.7	-1,535.2	-1.6	
Chinese	-16,500.8	1,523.3	4,670.0	
South Asian	-13,103.3	1,938.1	417.9	
Black	-15,872.1	-6,840.0	-3,782.8	
Other visible minorities	-13,726.9	-3,779.5	-1,680.3	
<i>Perceived discrimination (percent)</i>				
White	19.2	10.2	10.9	9.9
Visible minorities	33.6	35.5	42.2	
Chinese	35.4	30.9	34.5	
South Asian	28.2	34.1	43.4	
Black	44.8	47.7	60.9	
Other visible minorities	32.5	34.8	36.2	
<i>Perceived vulnerability (percent)</i>				
White	26.2	17.0	14.8	16.1
Visible minorities	41.8	37.8	27.0	
Chinese	40.8	32.3	20.2	
South Asian	40.7	39.9	28.4	
Black	49.8	44.5	37.2	
Other visible minorities	41.0	37.6	25.2	

Source: *Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2003).

¹ N's (depending on the outcome measure): Whites 740-770; Chinese 603-622; South Asians 455-479; Blacks 174-181; other visible minorities 563-585; all visible minorities 1,795-1,867.

² N's (depending on the outcome measure): Whites 4,992-5,186; Chinese 758-769; South Asians 643-675; Blacks 401-425; other visible minorities 999-1,032; all visible minorities 2,801-2,928.

³ N's (depending on the outcome measure): Whites 11,949-12,069; Chinese 889-897; South Asian 713-723; Black 677-691; other visible minorities 1,062-1,073; all visible minorities 3,341-3,384.

⁴ N's for Whites of third generation and higher (depending on the outcome measure): 14,247-14,375. Third-generation visible minorities are excluded.

⁵ Mean individual-equivalent household income, relative to the census metropolitan area (CMA) mean: The individual-equivalent income adjusts household incomes for household size, and is calculated by dividing household income by the square root of household size.

tions of immigrants may be equivalent to those of native-born Canadians yet not recognized by employers. Complaints about barriers to licensed trades and professions have been voiced for many years, and the first wave of the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada, based on interviews with approximately 12,000 immigrants arriving between October 2000 and September 2001 and released in 2003 (Statistics Canada 2005a), shows that the lack of recognition of foreign credentials or experience is one of the most commonly reported employment problems — along with lack of Canadian job experience and official language knowledge. The earnings lost due to this long-standing problem are potentially quite large, amounting to about \$2 billion annually (Reitz 2001a; Watt and Bloom 2001).¹⁷ These estimates may capture one significant result of racial discrimination.

The broader Canadian population remains skeptical of the significance of racial discrimination affecting minorities, and there is a prevailing view that racism is marginal in Canada (Reitz and Breton 1994). Even so, many members of the majority population recognize that discrimination exists. A CRIC-*Globe and Mail* survey entitled *The New Canada* shows that about three in four Canadians — both White and visible minority — agree that “there is a lot of racism in Canada” (Centre for Research and Information on Canada [CRIC]-*Globe and Mail* 2003; see also Breton 1990, 210-1). However, there are differences with respect to how significantly prejudice affects opportunities in key arenas such as employment. The survey shows that 42 percent of visible minorities think that prejudice affects opportunities, compared with 30 percent of Whites.¹⁸ Moreover, the actual racial divergence in perceptions of the significance of discrimination is greater than is reflected in this difference in percentages, because some Whites say it is Whites who lose opportunities because of discrimination (17 percent) — sometimes called “reverse discrimination” — whereas this perception is less common among visible minorities (7 percent).

The view that racial discrimination is not a significant problem in Canada undoubtedly contributes to a belief that existing government policies on the subject are adequate, so that further action is not needed. Official policies on multiculturalism and human rights are seen as sufficient to maintain what most Canadians would describe as a favourable environment for immigrants and minority groups, particularly by international standards. Only a minority of the White population think that prejudice is something that the Canadian government should address with more determination.¹⁹

Evidence of discrimination against racial minority immigrants

These are the perceptions, but what are the facts? In some ways, the research community is as divided as the general population. While the available research confirms that racial discrimination does exist, it allows for divergent interpretations of its significance.

Four types of evidence are cited in discussions of the extent of discrimination: prejudiced attitudes; evidence of discrimination in human rights cases; field tests of discrimination; and discrimination as revealed by statistical analysis of earnings gaps in labour market surveys. While each is useful, each is also problematic. Prejudiced attitudes could lead to discrimination, but not necessarily. Human rights case evidence may be persuasive, and the circumstances of a particular case may be suggestive of broader patterns, but it remains case-specific. Field trials show patterns of discrimination but not its consequences in the aggregate for minority inequality. Finally, statistical analyses of labour force data are open to diverse interpretations. However, when considered together, the four types of evidence suggest that the possibility of significant discrimination should be taken seriously. We deal with each in turn.

- 1) Attitude research reveals prejudice in Canada and a corresponding potential for discrimination. Not all attitudes toward minorities are negative, of course. Attitudes toward immigration in general tend to be more favourable in Canada than in societies receiving fewer immigrants (Simon and Lynch 1999). Gallup polls conducted almost every year between 1975 and 2001 have shown majority support for either maintaining or increasing Canada's emphasis on immigration (the exception being 1982, a recession year [Reitz 2004a, 111]). Yet research also makes it clear that racial boundaries are a reality of Canadian social life. For example, while most Canadians deny harbouring racist views, they maintain a "social distance" from minorities — that is, they say they prefer not to interact with members of other racial groups in certain social situations (Reitz and Breton 1994). Although an Environics Focus Canada poll showed that a large majority (93 percent in 2000) reject the proposal that "non-whites should not be allowed to immigrate to Canada" (Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson 2002, 72), there is much evidence that Canadians are more comfortable with groups of European origin than with non-European groups, and these preferences carry

implications for group status (Angus Reid Group 1991; Berry and Kalin 1995; Esses and Gardner 1996).

Racism and racial bias help determine attitudes toward immigration (Henry et al. 1998; Satzewich 1998), and concerns about the threat to jobs are related to racial attitudes (Palmer 1991, 1996; Esses et al. 2001; Kalin and Berry 1994; Berry and Kalin 1995). Some research suggests that Canadians see immigrants as posing an economic threat, and this view fuels a prejudicial backlash (Esses et al. 2001). If the political acceptability of immigration derives from the economic success of immigrants, then a dip in that success rate could politically undermine the program of immigration. There is little evidence as yet that this is occurring in Canada, demonstrating that the economic problems of the newly arrived do not quickly affect the overall tone of intergroup relations.

The potential impact of racial attitudes on discrimination is complex, however. Although prejudicial attitudes do not necessarily lead to discriminatory behaviour, they may be associated with such behaviour. For example, psychological research by Victoria Esses, Joerg Dietz and Arjun Bhardwaj shows that assessments of foreign qualifications tend to be lower among persons who show other evidence of racial bias or prejudice (2006). Discrimination may be displayed by persons who are not overtly prejudiced because of social pressure. For example, systemic discrimination arises when established practices in an organization exclude minorities. A complex phenomenon, systemic discrimination is only beginning to be understood, and its significance is being debated. A 1997 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decision that found systemic racial discrimination in the federal public service illustrates the complex nature of evidence required for legal proof (Beck, Reitz, and Weiner 2002).

- 2) The Human Rights Tribunal decision just cited serves as an example of the kind of evidence we can draw from human rights complaints, but, while compelling, it is only one case. It involved allegations that there was a glass ceiling for minorities in a particular federal department — that is, that systemic discrimination was practised by those responsible for promoting staff to senior managerial positions. There was evidence of statistical underrepresentation of minorities at the senior management

level; evidence derived from a survey on human resource practices of discrimination in the promotion process; and testimony about the attitudes of officials responsible for promotion decisions. The case is remarkable, partly because the respondent was a mainstream employer — the Government of Canada — generally considered an opponent of racial bias and discrimination.

- 3) Field tests have been conducted to find out if there is a variance in employer responses to people from different racial groups applying for the same jobs and presenting the same qualifications, and the results have offered persuasive evidence of discrimination. In Canada, the most cited study is still an early one conducted by Frances Henry and Effie Ginsberg (1985); their field tests reflected Whites receiving three times as many job offers as Blacks. The Economic Council of Canada repeated the field trials and produced different results: some interpret this as indicating a reduction in the significance of discrimination; others disagree (Reitz 1993; Reitz and Breton 1994, 84). It is unfortunate that such information is not kept current and readily available. Arguably, such studies should be repeated regularly and on a larger scale, in the manner of the program organized by the International Labour Office in Geneva (Zegers de Beijl 2000). Yet even this program does not address the question of the extent to which discrimination accounts for the overall economic inequalities experienced by racial minorities.
- 4) A large number of statistical studies show that within the labour force as a whole — relative to measured job qualifications, such as education or work experience, and with differences in knowledge of official languages taken into account — visible minority immigrants have lower earnings than their European counterparts or native-born Canadian workers of European origin. Some studies are Canada-wide (Li 1992; Boyd 1992; Christofides and Swidinsky 1994; Baker and Benjamin 1994); others are specific to immigrant-intensive settings, such as Toronto (Reitz 1990; Reitz and Sklar 1997). In either case, the amount of earnings disadvantage varies among minority groups and between genders. For immigrant men, it varies between 10 and 25 percent. Inequalities are greater for Blacks than for some Asian groups. Earnings disadvantages exist for immigrant women, although the amounts are

less, as the comparison group is native-born Canadian women, themselves a disadvantaged group compared with men.²⁰

Such analyses are useful in identifying potential discriminatory earnings gaps, but the earnings disadvantages of minorities are open to interpretation not just in terms of discrimination but also in terms of deficiencies in qualifications that cannot be measured in the survey data. Foreign-acquired educational qualifications might be of lower quality, foreign experience might not be relevant in Canada or language skills might be deficient in subtle but significant ways.

Education and employment for the children of immigrants

The education and employment experiences of Canadian-born children of immigrants (or of immigrants who arrive so young that their formative experiences occur in Canada) are regarded as critical to the long-term integration of racial minorities. In fact, their experiences may be a better test of the prevalence of racial discrimination. Earnings disadvantages for immigrants, even when controls for years of formal education or experience are applied, may be attributed to differences in the quality or Canadian relevance of foreign-acquired education or experience, or to language difficulties that are difficult to measure. Hence, several studies of discrimination have focused on experiences of racial minorities born in Canada, as their labour market experiences would not be affected by such characteristics.

Overall, the education levels of the racial minority second generation in Canada are fairly high — even relative to parental education levels — despite complaints of cultural and racial bias in Canadian schools, including universities. Since the federal government introduced multiculturalism as a policy framework, provincial authorities responsible for education have addressed this issue with multicultural, and then antiracist, policies (Davies and Guppy 1998; Dei 2000). While education researchers still point to racial biases among teachers and in the curriculum (Henry et al. 1998; James 1998), Scott Davies and Neil Guppy show, using the 1991 Census, that among persons 20 years of age and older, both immigrant and native-born visible minorities have significantly higher rates of high school graduation than the majority population (1998, 136).²¹

It is important, however, to distinguish descriptive findings on educational attainment from findings that bear on equality of opportunity in the school system. The emerging second generation are children of relatively well-educated

immigrants, many of whom arrived with the earlier minority immigrant cohorts of the 1970s and, despite difficulties, earned relatively high incomes. The education levels attained by their children do not necessarily reflect equality of opportunity, and barriers hidden in the analyses may subsequently come to light.²²

Possible variations in educational attainment by origin group may be important. For example, Davies and Guppy suggest that Black men have lower educational attainments (1998, 134-40). Alan Simmons and Dwaine Plaza conducted an age-specific analysis in Toronto of the university attendance of young adult immigrants and the native-born, distinguishing Blacks, South Asians and others. Whereas rates for the mainstream population are about 40 percent for women and 36 percent for men, for Blacks born in Canada, the figures are 40 and 27; for South Asians, they are 72 and 67. Simmons and Plaza conclude that young Black men in Canada show a modest disadvantage (1998).

Regarding the critical question of employment discrimination, analysis of the employment experiences of the children of immigrants has been hampered by statistical problems. One such problem stems from the small size of the second-generation population (de Silva 1992; Wanner 1998). Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson suggest that among native-born racial minorities, only Black men suffer employment discrimination (1999). By contrast, Krishna Pendakur and Ravi Pendakur have found that the racial disadvantage for native-born racial minorities is significant, albeit less so than for racial minority immigrants (1998, 2002; see also Li 2000; Reitz 2001a).

Another problem is the complexity of statistical models. Two studies illustrate these complexities by producing different results from the same data using different models. In one, Pendakur and Pendakur use long-form records for the 1971, 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1996 Censuses in a statistically robust analysis of the labour market position of native-born racial minorities (2002). To capture the impact of discriminatory access to employment sectors, as well as discriminatory access to the best jobs within sectors, their analytic model includes age, schooling, marital status, household size, official language and urban area, but not occupation, industry or hours. Earnings disadvantages for visible minorities are larger for men than for women, and among men, earnings disadvantages apply to Blacks, South Asians and, in most years, Chinese. The net earnings disadvantages of native-born visible minorities grew for both men and women from 1971 to 1996, leading Pendakur and Pendakur to conclude that “inequity is seen to be on

the rise” (2002, 510). Robert Swidinsky and Michael Swidinsky use the same 1996 data but a smaller public-use sample, a different model in which the criterion is weekly wages, and a different group of control variables, not including occupation. They find less discrimination and a different pattern of group differences (Swidinsky and Swidinsky 2002). While the differences between the two studies illustrate the complexities of analysis, it is useful to note that in both, Black males experience the greatest earnings disadvantages, and this is the group that most often reports discrimination in interview surveys.

Summary

Among the various ethnic groups in Canada, racial minorities have the lowest incomes and highest rates of poverty, and many members of these groups believe they have experienced discrimination based on their minority racial origins. Although the economic situation is somewhat better for those who have been in Canada longer and for the Canadian-born generation, the perception that they have been affected by discrimination is more widespread among the latter two groups. In fact, there is a racial divide over perceptions of discrimination. In this context, the research on the extent of discrimination — although it does not conclusively point to discrimination as a significant cause of racial inequality — does not conclusively resolve the question.

Social Cohesion and the Social Integration of Racial Minorities

ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF RACIAL INEQUALITY AND PERCEPTIONS OF discrimination may have many different aspects. Ultimately, our concern in this chapter is with the cohesion of society and the impact of minorities on that cohesion. Here, “cohesion” refers to the capacity of society to set and implement collective goals.²³ Lack of cohesion may be reflected in conflict, sometimes violent conflict. Instances of civil disorder involving immigrants or minorities in other countries — most recently, France and the United Kingdom — have reinforced these concerns. We should remember, however, that conflict does not necessarily detract from cohesion: it may actually help resolve problems of intergroup relations and, hence, be an

essential part of social life in a cohesive society. Finally, lack of social cohesion is manifested in other less dramatic but equally important ways, including lack of participation in decision-making, withdrawal of support for decisions and lack of organizational capacity to participate in constructive social activities.

The following discussion focuses on the integration of racial minorities as an important aspect of the Canadian social fabric. It also considers the impact of inequality and discrimination on minority social integration. Here, “social integration” refers to the extent to which individual members of a group form relationships with people outside the group — relationships that help them to achieve individual economic, social or cultural goals. Social integration, in this sense, is relevant to the broader question of social cohesion: groups whose members look to the broader society as a means to private ends are more likely to become engaged in common objectives; similarly, groups that are well integrated into society become resources for the constructive resolution of conflicts.

The integration of minority groups into society is a matter of individual attitudes and behaviour, and of social organization and resources. In the Ethnic Diversity Survey, which provides data on individuals, the analysis focuses on those attitudes and behaviours that are expected to reflect integration into society. Three of these seem especially relevant here: strength of individual ties to the group, overall satisfaction with life (presumably a reflection of a sense of having achieved personal goals) and extent of civic participation.

Several EDS survey questions tap into these aspects.²⁴ Regarding individual ties to Canadian society, there are measures of sense of belonging to Canada, trust in others, self-identification as Canadian and acquisition of Canadian citizenship. The first two measures are broad indicators of the strength of interpersonal relations, whereas self-identification as Canadian is a more specific indication of belonging in the national society;²⁵ and acquisition of citizenship, though it may reflect a number of motives, is a concrete expression of belonging in Canadian society.

Regarding the second aspect — overall life satisfaction — there is a single question. The third aspect — civic participation — is reflected in the following two items: participation in voluntary organizations and voting in federal elections. The survey question on participation in voluntary organizations probes deeper than simple membership, asking whether the respondent contributes on a voluntary basis to the activities of the organization. The question on voting asks

about federal elections.²⁶ Voting is a meaningful indicator of participation in the Canadian community, but as citizenship is a prerequisite to voting, and acquisition of citizenship reflects various circumstances, it is important to restrict analyses of voting to an examination of those who are Canadian citizens and were eligible to vote in the last federal election prior to the survey date.²⁷

Table 3 compares the results for all seven indicators for Whites and visible minorities. On six of the seven indicators, visible minorities appear less integrated. The greatest gap between visible minorities and Whites is in self-identification as Canadian (30.7 percentage points). There are also significant gaps in citizenship (18.3 percentage points) and in voting (11.1 percentage points). The gap in citizenship undoubtedly reflects, at least in part, the significantly higher proportion of immigrants among visible minorities. There are smaller racial gaps in life satisfaction (5.5 percentage points) and volunteering (7.2 percentage points). On two indicators — sense of belonging and trust in others — there does not appear to be a significant overall racial difference. Visible minorities, in fact, express a somewhat stronger sense of belonging than Whites.

Some of these generalizations apply to most visible minorities; others do not. The most pervasive pattern affecting all visible minorities is the substantially lower level of Canadian identity and voting. All also have lower rates of citizenship. Regarding life satisfaction and trust, there are clear variations among groups. Lower life satisfaction affects Chinese in particular, while the other groups are closer to the White average. Less trust in others affects Blacks, while South Asians and other visible minorities are near the White average; Chinese are more than 10 percentage points above the White average. Some groups have lower levels of integration in most aspects, particularly Blacks and Chinese. Blacks have the highest rate of volunteer work, followed by South Asians and other visible minorities; Chinese are lower than Whites.

Recency of immigration, trends over time and the second generation

Most visible minorities have a high proportion of recent arrivals in Canada. Hence, the question arises: How is the social integration of racial minorities related to the recent arrival of these groups in Canada? Moreover, to what extent, if at all, are racial minorities slower to integrate than immigrants of European origin? To respond, we begin by examining three groups by immigrant cohort and generation: recent immigrants, immigrants arriving 10 or more years before the survey

Integration of Visible
Minorities into
Canadian Society,
2002 (percent)

	Belonging ¹	Trust ¹	Canadian identity ¹	Citizenship ¹	Life satisfaction ¹	Volunteering ¹	Voted in federal election ²
Whites	54.8	49.9	64.3	97.30	47.2	33.8	81.9
All visible minorities	58.6	47.9	33.6	78.96	41.7	26.6	70.8
<i>Specific minority origins</i>							
Chinese	52.7	60.1	40.5	83.90	30.8	20.7	68.1
South Asian	64.9	49.0	30.5	73.30	48.4	29.1	76.1
Blacks	60.6	30.6	29.0	80.80	43.5	34.6	71.8
Other visible minorities	58.3	45.5	32.0	78.00	45.2	26.1	69.5

Source: *Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2003).

¹ N's (depending on the outcome measure): Whites 31,341- 32,660; all visible minorities 8,149-8,622; Chinese 2,267-2,421; South Asians 1,755-1,892; Blacks 1,347- 1,424; other visible minorities 2,757-2,885.

² The analysis of voting is restricted to eligible voters, namely, citizens and those at least 20 years old. N's: Whites 28,250; all visible minorities 5,581; Chinese 1,646; South Asians 1,159; Blacks 888; other visible minorities 1,888.


and the second generation, born in Canada. Next, we analyze these groups using statistical methods to adjust for specific years of residence in Canada and for age (this is particularly important for the second generation).

The results show two interesting trends. On the one hand, recent arrival helps explain some of the racial differences in social integration in Canada. On the other hand, in a number of instances, the racial gap is larger in the categories representing longer experience in Canada. It is smallest for the recent arrivals, but larger for immigrants in the country at least 10 years and for the second generation. In figures 1 through 5, data are presented graphically for visible minorities in total and for specific groups for five of the seven indicators where the racial gap is most pronounced. Detailed figures for all seven indicators are in appendix 1.

There is a large racial gap in self-identification as Canadian — about 30 percentage points. Figure 1 shows that for recently arrived immigrants, there is no racial gap; indeed, the Chinese group is more likely to identify as Canadian than are groups of European origin. For earlier immigrants, the extent of Canadian identification is higher for both Whites and racial minorities, presumably reflecting their higher sense of commitment to Canada, but the difference is greater for Whites than for racial minorities. For earlier immigrants of European origin, Canadian identification is higher than it is for newcomers by almost 32 percentage points, whereas for earlier immigrants who are racial minorities Canadian identification is higher than for newcomers by only 13 percentage points. Thus, a racial gap of 19 percentage points in the acquisition of self-identification as Canadian is evident for the earlier immigrants. Overall, racial minorities are slower to acquire a sense of identification as Canadian than are immigrants of European origin; this difference can be observed for all racial minority groups, including Chinese. Perhaps equally significantly, among the second generation, for Whites, the rate of Canadian identification is quite high — 78.2 percent — while for racial minorities, it lags by over 20 percentage points.²⁸

We see a similar pattern with regard to citizenship and voting. In the case of citizenship, the lower rate for visible minorities is indeed strongly related to their recent arrival; and, in fact, among visible minorities, there is no difference in citizenship acquisition for recent immigrants, and a somewhat higher reported rate of citizenship acquisition for immigrants in the country 10 or more years. This is true particularly for Chinese, but it is also true for the other major racial minorities.

Canadian Identity



Source: Appendix 1.


The analysis of voting (figure 2) shows that the lower rate of voting for racial minorities is partly a result of more recent arrival. For the most recently arrived immigrants, there is no difference in voting between racial minorities and those of European origin. When we look at the voting rates for earlier visible minority immigrants, however, we find that they fall short of the rate for Whites, suggesting that these people are voting less than one might expect based on citizenship eligibility (which is higher for racial minorities than for Whites). But it is among the second generation that the most obvious racial differences arise. Among second-generation Whites, the rate of voting is 84 percent, compared with 69.9 percent for Chinese, 66.9 percent for South Asians, 63.3 percent for other visible minorities and 55.5 percent for Blacks. Among racial minorities, the rate of voting is 64.3 percent, and the racial gap in voting in the second generation is about 20 percentage points.

Regarding the sense of belonging to Canada (figure 3), which overall is higher for visible minority groups than for Whites, generational analysis shows that this higher rate is most pronounced for immigrants, particularly recent immigrants. Among the second generation, all visible minorities have less of a sense of belonging than Whites. This is most striking in the case of Blacks, but is quite pronounced for Chinese and other visible minorities, and it is significant even for South Asians.

Regarding life satisfaction (figure 4), the overall racial difference is not really a function of recent arrival, since recent visible minority immigrants are not less satisfied than Whites. Among recent immigrants, except for Chinese, racial minorities report higher levels of satisfaction than do those of European origin. High levels of satisfaction for recent immigrants may be expected based on comparisons they make between life in their homeland and the future they expect in Canada. However, this is different for immigrants who have been in the country longer and for the second generation. For the earlier immigrants, the racial difference is minimal (again, with low levels for Chinese), and for the second generation, levels of satisfaction are lower for all racial minorities than for Whites. In comparing the three categories, then, levels of satisfaction become less, relative to Whites, when one moves from recent immigrants to earlier immigrants to the second generation.


Regarding trust (figure 5), low levels for Blacks are evident in all groups, including the second generation; low levels are also evident for South Asians and other visible minorities. As appendix 1 shows, the high levels of volunteering for

Voting




Source: Appendix 1.

Belonging




Source: Appendix 1.

Life Satisfaction



Source: Appendix 1.

Trust



Source: Appendix 1.


Blacks relative to Whites are evident among the immigrants, but not the second generation. In the second generation, there are few group differences on this indicator.

Patterns of integration are time-sensitive, and the categories recent immigrants, earlier immigrants and second generation contain certain time-related variations. Among the earlier immigrants, the Whites arrived significantly earlier than the racial minorities; among the second generation, the Whites tend to be older than the racial minorities. Because of these patterns, we conducted a further analysis within each of the three categories, using regression procedures,²⁹ in which the impact of racial origins was examined controlling for recency of immigration (for the two immigrant groups) and for age. The results are presented graphically in figure 6 (for the dichotomous indicators, and presenting odds ratios based on logistic regression) and figure 7 (for indicators with more categories, and based on ordinary least squares [OLS] regression coefficients); detailed figures are in appendix 2 (which includes regression results for racial minorities overall, and separate regression results for specific minority groups included as dummy variables).

For four indicators — Canadian identity and voting (figure 6), and belonging and life satisfaction (figure 7) — the impact of visible minority status becomes more negative as one moves from recent immigrants to earlier immigrants and the second generation. It is interesting that racial minority immigrants have a stronger sense of belonging than White immigrants, but the trend is to a smaller gap favouring racial minorities (for the earlier immigrants compared with recent immigrants), and then to a gap favouring Whites (for the second generation). When it comes to voting, except for the most recent immigrants, rates among racial minorities are less than for Whites, contrary to what might be expected based on citizenship. This indicates that the lack of an overall racial difference in voting among earlier immigrants is a result of higher rates of citizenship (logistic regression coefficient of 1.3, translating into an odds ratio of 3.8), then lower rates of voting among those who are citizens. In the second generation, the effect of racial minority status on voting is even more substantially negative, after controlling for age. The regression results for individual groups show that the negative effect is particularly significant for Blacks and also for other visible minorities (appendix 2).

In the case of trust, the effect of visible minority status is negative for recent immigrants, and then more strongly negative for earlier immigrants. However, among the second generation, the effect of visible minority status on


Effect of Visible
Minority Status on
Indicators of
Integration
(odds ratio)



Source: Appendix 2.

Note: Based on logistic regression analysis for effect of visible minority status with controls for age and, for immigrants, years since immigration. Results expressed as odds ratios; see note to appendix 2. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate that effect of visible minority status is positive, while those less than 1 indicate that effect of visible minority status is negative.

Effects of Visible Minority Status on Indicators of Integration¹



Source: Appendix 2.

¹ Standardized OLS regression coefficients for effect of visible minority status with controls for age and, for immigrants, years since immigration.

trust is less negative than it is among the earlier immigrants, though still more negative than it is for the most recent arrivals.

The pattern for volunteering is different; the effect of visible minority status is more positive for earlier immigrants and the second generation than it is for the recent immigrants. It also varies greatly by group. Chinese immigrants tend to volunteer less often than their White counterparts, while Black immigrants are more likely to volunteer. For recent South Asian immigrants and other visible minority immigrants, there is no significant difference in the likelihood of volunteering compared with Whites; earlier South Asian immigrants are somewhat more likely to volunteer. Among the second generation, there is little racial difference in the likelihood of volunteering. Second-generation South Asians are the only racial minority significantly more likely to volunteer than their White counterparts.

A finding of negative trends in social integration for racial minorities compared with White immigrant groups in Canada, most evident among those with greater experience in the country, may be important. Although social integration of minorities might be expected to reduce the significance of group differences among those with experience in Canada, the impact of racial boundaries actually seems larger. This suggests that certain experiences in Canada produce racial differences in integration and raises the question of what these experiences may be.

Impact of inequality and perceptions of inequality

What is the impact of inequality and perceptions of inequality on these relatively slower rates of integration for visible minorities in Canada? To answer this question, we regressed three indicators of inequality — household income, perceptions of discrimination, and perceptions of vulnerability — on the seven indicators of integration for visible minorities separately by immigrant cohort and generation, and controlling for time-related variables. From the results (see appendix 3),³⁰ it is evident that low income in itself has relatively modest effects on slowing integration. The most statistically significant effects (in this direction) are for the earlier immigrants, particularly effects on the sense of trust. Experiences of discrimination are a more important influence on life satisfaction, trust and sense of belonging, while perceived vulnerability is a more important influence on life satisfaction, trust in others and Canadian identity. But these effects are limited and apply to immigrant groups rather than to the second generation, among whom lower rates of integration are most evident.

The modest size of the effects of low income on social integration for visible minorities suggests that low income itself is unlikely to explain differences in social integration between visible minorities and Whites. Since the effects of perceived discrimination and vulnerability are more often significant for the integration of visible minorities, they may play a larger role in accounting for their slower integration compared with Whites — but again, this is unlikely to be a complete explanation.

We explored these implications in further regression analyses, which show how the effects of visible minority status on various attachments are affected by controls for household income, and then for perceived discrimination and vulnerability (detailed regression results appear in appendix 4). Regarding Canadian identity and the sense of belonging, the three indicators of inequality explain only a small part of the racial difference in integration, and of these three, the most relevant are perceived discrimination and vulnerability. Consider the analysis of Canadian identity (third panel in appendix 4). For recent immigrants, there is no effect of visible minority status (after controls for time-related variables), and further controls for income level or perceptions of discrimination and vulnerability do not alter this relation. For earlier immigrants, the effect of visible minority status is -0.4542 (after controls for time-related variables). In the next two regressions, we address the question of how this is affected by low income or perceptions of discrimination or vulnerability. We see that the effect is about the same after taking account of the effect of low income (-0.4528), and only somewhat weaker after taking account of the effect of perceived discrimination and vulnerability (-0.3499). For the second generation, the negative effect of visible minority status on Canadian identity is stronger (-0.8382), but in this case, again, there is virtually no effect of control for incomes (the coefficient remains about the same, at -0.8478), and very little effect of control for perceptions of discrimination and vulnerability (the coefficient is only slightly weaker, at -0.7867).

For sense of belonging (the first panel in appendix 4), the effect of visible minority status is positive for immigrants, and controls have little impact on this. For the second generation, the effect of visible minority status on sense of belonging is negative (-0.3374), virtually unaffected by the control for low income (-0.3340), and made only slightly weaker by the control for perception of discrimination and vulnerability (-0.2690).

Inequality also explains little of the racial difference in trust in others and life satisfaction, and, again, income matters less than perceived discrimination or vulnerability (the second and fifth panels in appendix 4, respectively). Regarding trust in oth-

ers, the racial effects are not explained by income levels, but they are partly (or, in the case of recent immigrants, entirely) explained by perceived discrimination and vulnerability. Regarding life satisfaction, the significant racial difference is in the second generation, and this difference is not at all explained by income levels, but it is partly accounted for by perceived discrimination and vulnerability. In terms of the remaining indicators, the regressions offer explanations in only a few instances. High rates of citizenship for visible minority immigrants are not related to inequalities. The racial difference in voting is not at all related to income levels. In the second generation, the racial difference in voting is even greater after the control for income; it is only slightly reduced when perceived discrimination or vulnerability is taken into account.

The foregoing analysis was repeated with the effect of each of the four racial minority categories separately examined. We find that regarding Canadian identity and voting, inequalities do not explain the lower levels for any of the minority groups. The same is true regarding sense of belonging among the second generation. In the case of trust and life satisfaction, in the groups where there are lower levels, perceived discrimination again matters more than lower income, and there is a residual negative effect unexplained by any of the inequality-related variables.

Implications

These data from the Ethnic Diversity Survey permit us to make a systematic assessment of the integration of visible minorities, and it is the first such evidence detailing the situation of the second generation. We can summarize our findings under three points. First, Whites with greater experience in Canada are better integrated into society than are visible minorities. The negative trends with greater experience in Canada are most pronounced with regard to self-identification as Canadian and voting, but they are also found in sense of belonging, trust in others and life satisfaction. Yet visible minorities are more likely than Whites to become citizens, and there are no major differences in volunteering.

Second, although visible minority immigrants have lower earnings than Whites, at an individual level, low earnings in and of themselves contribute little or nothing to these trends in social integration. Rather, negative trends in integration reflect more pronounced experiences of discrimination and vulnerability, which become, or remain, pronounced for the second generation.

Third, many of the most important trends affect all visible minorities. Perhaps most significantly, in the second generation, all visible minority groups

are more negative on all indicators. Nevertheless, some groups consistently show more negative patterns than others. In the second generation, Blacks and South Asians are least likely to self-identify as Canadian; Blacks and other visible minorities are least likely to vote; Blacks, Chinese and other visible minorities are least likely to have a sense of belonging in Canada.

In sum, improvement in immigrants' earnings may contribute to successful integration, but higher earnings alone do not smooth the path to integration. The analysis here suggests that experiences of discrimination and vulnerability remain, slowing the social integration of minorities. Furthermore, these effects may be intensified for the children of immigrants, whose expectation of equality may be greater than was the case for their parents.

Among visible minorities, Blacks consistently experience the greatest inequality, and their integration into Canadian society is slower. However, the fact that none of the indicators of inequality fully explains the slower integration of visible minorities suggests that the awareness that one's group standing is problematic may affect how individuals feel about society, even those not focusing on specific disadvantages. This requires further analysis.

P o l i c y I s s u e s : M a n a g i n g D i v e r s i t y u n d e r C o n d i t i o n s o f I n e q u a l i t y

THESE FINDINGS ON RACIAL INEQUALITY AND THE SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF MINORITIES carry implications for broader issues of multiculturalism and pluralism in Canada. If the racial gap in perceptions of equality and the slower integration of racial minorities are significant, then we may well ask whether existing policies are adequate to address the potential threat to social cohesion. The following discussion points to one feature of existing policy that may affect that potential threat — namely, policy goals and the processes of setting them.

Goals of Canadian multiculturalism and antiracism

Multiculturalism is the centrepiece of Canada's policy on interethnic relations, and its focus is on broad ideals rather than specific goals and objectives. Canada has been an innovator in multiculturalism policies, which have been embraced at

all levels of government since their initial proclamation, in 1971 (Quebec does not embrace the label “multiculturalism,” even though its policies have similar goals). The initial formulation articulated very broad equity objectives (Canada, House of Commons 1971, 8545-6), but there were few specifics. Reactions to the policy of multiculturalism have been varied: some have supported it as the essence of modern conceptions of equality (Kymlicka 1995); others have criticized it as divisive (Bissoondath 1994; Schlesinger 1992). Despite the lack of consensus, since the Canadian policy has developed with the passage of explicit legislation and the multicultural character of the country is protected in the Constitution, the emphasis on broad ideals has held firm.

Racial barriers have been identified across a range of institutions in Canada, and many policy arenas touch on this issue of race relations. These include immigration and settlement policy; human rights policy; employment policy, including that which addresses discrimination and recognition of immigrant qualifications; policies for minority equality in public services; and policies for policing and the administration of justice in minority communities. But policies designed to address the special needs of visible minorities and to promote racial equality have been developed without an emphasis on specifics and with perhaps an even smaller consensus on objectives. When race relations was introduced under the rubric of multiculturalism in the 1980s, it was not recognized in principle as a separate concern.³¹

Governments have responded to race issues as they have arisen, but with little coordination or continuity. In the 1970s, instances of violence against racial minorities in Toronto resulted in a municipal task force report entitled *Now Is Not Too Late* (Task Force on Human Relations 1977). In the 1980s, the federal government responded to racial issues with a report called *Equality Now! Participation of Visible Minorities in Canadian Society* (Canada, House of Commons 1984). This prompted some policy development; the *Employment Equity Act, 1986* included provisions for visible minorities. More recently, *A Canada for All: Canada's Action Plan against Racism* has attempted to coordinate existing policies directed at racial equality rather than initiate new ones (Department of Canadian Heritage 2005). Like previous efforts, this one has very broad goals and offers few specifics.

Policy related to racial minorities is spread throughout agencies and levels of government. One example of lack of coordination is the policies that address the deteriorating employment situation of newly arrived immigrants (Reitz 2005).

A number of relevant policies are in place, but they have not been developed in a coordinated way. At the federal level, Citizenship and Immigration Canada is responsible for immigrant selection and settlement; Canadian Heritage, Human Resources and Social Development Canada and various other departments are responsible for related policies. Most policies involve activities for which responsibility is divided among various levels of government, and the responsible parties have taken approaches that are in some respects complementary and in others diverse — even contradictory. A recent example is the federal plan, announced by the Harper government, to create an agency to assess foreign-acquired credentials; it takes little account of existing provincial agencies. Instead, we need a comprehensive policy initiative that addresses such issues as immigrant employment, settlement programs, recognition of immigrant qualifications, bridge training and employment discrimination. And all of this should be considered in relation to the ongoing success of the immigration program. Coordination might be enhanced by the creation of a unit within the federal government (perhaps directed by a cabinet minister) responsible for immigration-related policies and with the authority to initiate discussions with provincial and municipal governments to promote greater consistency and effective policy-making.

Provincial governments have not considered race relations in a consistent manner. In Ontario, an Anti-racism Secretariat advisory group within the Ministry of Citizenship was abolished by the Harris government, which also abolished the provincial *Employment Equity Act* on the grounds that it gave undue preference to racial minorities. Similarly, a network of Toronto municipal committees on community and race relations functioned for many years but disappeared in the wake of municipal amalgamation and budget reductions mandated by the province in the late 1990s.

Illustrative of the lack of policy specificity (at all levels of government) regarding goals is the absence of provision for their formal evaluation. Evaluation requires explicit goals, and these are not in place. Multiculturalism policy itself has never been evaluated in the specific social sciences sense of the word, which implies direct observation of program impact. Jeffrey Reitz and Raymond Breton have shown that intergroup relations involving immigrants (including racial minority ones) in Canada are not markedly different from those in the US, a finding that casts doubt on the notion that Canada's multiculturalism has a dramatic impact (1994). In fact, a perception of multiculturalism as largely symbolic and

incapable of creating a major social impact has been reinforced by the fact that program expenditures are very small. Whatever the impact of policies such as multiculturalism on paving the way for the social integration of immigrants, the findings here suggest that they may have worked less well for racial minority groups than for White immigrant groups.

Public information and goal setting

Canadians agree on the primacy of equal opportunity in principle but differ on the question of putting it into practice. The gap between the widespread perception among racial minorities of problems with equal opportunity and skepticism among political leaders about the need to address such problems is, to some extent, a gap in perception of fact; hence, consensus might be assisted by clarification of relevant facts. In this context, the lack of credible research information on which to base political decision-making poses difficulties.

Universities, research centres, public foundations and interest groups could provide an adequate research base from which to address these needs, but university-based research on immigration and race relations is a low-priority activity, often conducted with few resources. And the recently established network of immigration research centres (part of the Metropolis Project) provides resources for only small-scale research. The Canadian Race Relations Foundation is another resource that could be tapped, but government departments have been reluctant to do so, possibly because they are concerned that such research will exacerbate rather than resolve controversies. In the past, royal commissions have focused attention on topics of national priority, and the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System made significant contributions to knowledge, though follow-up reforms have been slow.

However, the most significant subject — employment equality and discrimination — lacks a solid research base. In the final analysis, public authorities should confront the issue of the perception of discrimination directly, thereby avoiding criticism for sidestepping the issue.

Political participation

Immigrants have high rates of citizenship acquisition, but minority access to electoral office has been limited (Black 2000, 2001). Their small size in any political constituency and low voting rates contribute to this. In Toronto, urban amalga-

mation and reduction in the size of the Ontario Legislative Assembly has increased the size of constituencies, thereby exacerbating the problem of representation (Siemiatycki and Isin 1998; Siemiatycki and Saloogee 2000). Avenues of access to political decision-making for minority groups include the ethnic community itself — through its leaders' connections to individual politicians — or advisory groups established to provide minority input into decision-making (Breton 1990). The effectiveness of such means of representation is debated.

These problems of access may be related to the low rates of voting among racial minorities, as shown by the EDS data cited earlier. If racial minorities experience distinctive problems but have difficulty gaining a voice within Canada's political institutions, then proactive measures are needed to ensure that their viewpoints are reflected in decision-making. Here, a national advisory council would be useful. Such a council could address concerns about the impact of immigration on race relations and social cohesion. An effective council would have the means for independent fact-finding, which would allow it to explore the most divisive issues in an authoritative manner. One such issue is racial discrimination in employment.

C o n c l u s i o n s

THIS DISCUSSION HAS COMBINED EXISTING RESEARCH ON RACIAL INEQUALITY IN Canada with an analysis of the social integration of racial minorities based on the 2002 EDS, raising questions about Canadian policies directed at racial minorities and arriving at three basic conclusions. First, the rapidly growing racial minority populations in Canada experience much greater inequality than do traditional European-origin immigrant groups, and discrimination is a widespread concern for racial minorities. The debate among researchers over the significance of racial discrimination, so far inconclusive, is paralleled by a broader debate across society, and this debate seems to divide racial groups.

Second, social integration into Canadian society for racial minorities is slower than it is for immigrants of European origin, partly as a result of their sense of exclusion, represented by perceived discrimination. It is striking that indications of lack of integration into Canadian society are so significant for second-generation minorities, since they are regarded as the harbinger of the future. Educational and

employment success for many within these racial minority groups may not be the only matter of social and political relevance. The evidence suggests that economic integration does not guarantee social integration, although it may contribute to such integration.

Third, based on a brief overview, we conclude that it is far from clear that existing policies are adequate to address the evident racial divide in Canadian society. Policies have emphasized the laudable ideals of equal opportunity and opposition to racism, but they lack the features that would enable them to effectively bridge that racial divide. More specifically, existing policies are weakened by their failure to present clear objectives, reflecting a lack of interracial consensus on the significance of the problem of discrimination and a lack of will to create such a consensus. These policies also lack the means to ensure effective implementation, intergovernmental coordination or evaluation.

Underlying these circumstances is a lack of effective participation by racial minorities themselves in the political decision-making process. Given the salience of equality issues for these groups, such issues may require more attention in the future. Without a new recognition of the significance of racial equality issues within the majority population, the most important precondition for improved policy may be the creation of more effective means for minority group participation.

Social Integration of
Whites and Visible
Minorities, by
Immigrant Cohort and
Generation, 2002
(percent)

		Immigrants		Second generation ³	Third generation and higher ⁴
		Recent ¹	Earlier ²		
Belonging	Whites	47.9	60.9	57.3	53.3
	Total visible minorities	60.7	61.8	44.1	
	Chinese	52.1	55.5	44.6	
	South Asian	69.8	64.8	50.7	
	Black	65.3	69.1	37.0	
	Other visible minorities	60.3	61.4	44.1	
Trust	Whites	56.4	56.3	55.2	47.4
	Total visible minorities	52.5	45.6	44.8	
	Chinese	69.0	54.9	52.0	
	South Asian	48.2	51.4	42.0	
	Black	34.1	26.2	36.7	
	Other visible minorities	47.4	43.7	46.0	
Canadian Identity	Whites	21.9	53.8	78.2	63.4
	Total visible minorities	21.4	34.4	56.6	
	Chinese	30.6	42.0	59.5	
	South Asian	19.1	32.7	53.6	
	Black	13.9	27.2	49.6	
	Other visible minorities	17.4	32.8	60.6	
Citizenship	Whites	48.2	85.6		
	Total visible minorities	51.1	92.0		
	Chinese	61.7	96.9		
	South Asian	43.9	88.8		
	Black	45.6	88.2		
	Other visible minorities	48.6	92.0		
Life Satisfaction	Whites	34.4	50.6	45.9	47.4
	Total visible minorities	39.3	45.5	34.6	
	Chinese	25.8	35.3	27.7	
	South Asian	48.6	49.9	42.0	
	Black	43.7	47.9	33.3	
	Other visible minorities	43.1	49.2	36.3	

(cont. on p. 41)

Social Integration of
Whites and Visible
Minorities, by
Immigrant Cohort and
Generation, 2002
(percent)
(cont. from p. 40)

		Immigrants		Second generation ³	Third generation and higher ⁴
		Recent ¹	Earlier ²		
Volunteering	Whites	22.1	28.6	36.5	34.5
	Total visible minorities	21.0	27.6	36.2	
	Chinese	17.7	19.2	32.4	
	South Asian	22.3	31.2	42.1	
	Black	34.3	35.2	37.1	
	Other visible minorities	18.9	28.4	35.2	
Voting⁵	Whites	53.4	87.1	84.0	81.0
	Total visible minorities	54.0	77.8	64.3	
	Chinese	50.2	75.4	69.9	
	South Asian	59.2	82.9	66.9	
	Black	47.1	84.6	55.5	
	Other visible minorities	57.0	73.8	63.3	

Source: *Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2003).

¹ *N*'s for recent immigrants: Whites 715-770; Chinese 580-622; South Asians 433-479; Blacks 167-181; other visible minorities 543-585. *N*'s for total visible minorities (depending on the outcome variable): 1,734-1,867.

² *N*'s for earlier immigrants: Whites 4,843-5,186; Chinese 714-769; South Asians 609-675; Blacks 396-425; other visible minorities 978-1,032. *N*'s for total visible minorities (depending on the outcome variable): 2,697-2,928.

³ *N*'s for second generation: Whites 11,766-12,069; Chinese 874-897; South Asians 703-723; Blacks 664-691; other visible minorities 1,040-1,073. *N*'s for total visible minorities (depending on the outcome variable): 3,281-3,384.

⁴ *N*'s: 13,572-14,375, depending on the outcome variable.

⁵ The analysis of voting is restricted to eligible voters, namely, citizens and those at least 20 years old. Correspondingly, *N*'s will be lower than for other variables. The impact of citizenship on voting analysis may be inferred from citizenship rates shown in the table. Detailed *N*'s are available from the authors.

Social Integration of
Visible Minorities, with
Controls for Time-
Related Variables

Dependent variable	Explanatory variable	Immigrants		Second generation
		Recent	Earlier	
Belonging (OLS)	Visible Minority (coeff.)	0.2443***	0.1809***	-0.3374***
	Chinese (coeff.)	-0.0127 <i>ns</i>	-0.0143 <i>ns</i>	-0.2851***
	South Asian (coeff.)	0.5335***	0.3213***	-0.2321***
	Black (coeff.)	0.4547***	0.3393***	-0.5156***
	Other Visible Minority (coeff.)	0.2001**	0.1592***	-0.3355***
Trust (logistic)	Visible Minority (coeff.)	-0.1625 <i>ns</i>	-0.4013***	-0.3202***
	(Odds ratios)	0.8500	0.6694	0.7260
	Chinese (coeff.)	0.5680***	-0.0009 <i>ns</i>	-0.0504 <i>ns</i>
	South Asian (coeff.)	-0.3734**	-0.1575 <i>ns</i>	-0.4221***
	Black (coeff.)	-0.9162***	-1.2761***	-0.6554***
Other Visible Minority (coeff.)	-0.3688**	-0.4664***	-0.2769**	
Canadian Identity (logistic)	Visible Minority (coeff.)	0.0221 <i>ns</i>	-0.4542***	-0.8382***
	(Odds ratios)	1.0223	0.6350	0.4325
	Chinese (coeff.)	0.4676**	-0.1100 <i>ns</i>	-0.7729***
	South Asian (coeff.)	-0.0437 <i>ns</i>	-0.5499***	-0.9084***
	Black (coeff.)	-0.5540 <i>ns</i>	-0.8691***	-1.1347***
Other Visible Minority (coeff.)	-0.2461 <i>ns</i>	-0.4862***	-0.6592***	
Citizenship (logistic)	Visible Minority (coeff.)	0.2520*	1.3442***	n/a
	(Odds ratios)	1.2866	3.8351	n/a
	Chinese (coeff.)	0.7931***	2.4325***	n/a
	South Asian (coeff.)	0.1405 <i>ns</i>	1.0093***	n/a
	Black (coeff.)	-0.2939 <i>ns</i>	0.7433***	n/a
Other Visible Minority (coeff.)	0.0288 <i>ns</i>	1.4008***	n/a	

(cont. on p. 43)

Social Integration of
Visible Minorities, with
Controls for Time-
Related Variables
(cont. from p. 42)

Dependent variable	Explanatory variable	Immigrants		Second generation
		Recent	Earlier	
Life Satisfaction (OLS)	Visible Minority (coeff.)	-0.0248 <i>ns</i>	-0.0712*	-0.2220***
	Chinese (coeff.)	-0.1829**	-0.2269***	-0.2299***
	South Asian (coeff.)	0.1160 <i>ns</i>	0.0447 <i>ns</i>	-0.0902 <i>ns</i>
	Black (coeff.)	-0.0490 <i>ns</i>	-0.0812 <i>ns</i>	-0.4027***
	Other Visible Minority (coeff.)	0.0209 <i>ns</i>	-0.0228 <i>ns</i>	-0.1845***
Volunteering (logistic)	Visible Minority (coeff.) (Odds ratios)	-0.0358 <i>ns</i> 0.9648	0.0483 <i>ns</i> 1.0495	0.0427 <i>ns</i> 1.0436
	Chinese (coeff.)	-0.2584*	-0.4307***	-0.1439 <i>ns</i>
	South Asian (coeff.)	0.0587 <i>ns</i>	0.2186*	0.3012***
	Black (coeff.)	0.6477***	0.4005***	0.0925 <i>ns</i>
	Other Visible Minority (coeff.)	0.1736 <i>ns</i>	0.0802 <i>ns</i>	0.0006 <i>ns</i>
Voting (logistic) ¹	Visible Minority (coeff.) (Odds ratios)	0.0120 <i>ns</i> 1.0121	-0.0762 <i>ns</i> 0.9266	-0.8932*** 0.4093
	Chinese (coeff.)	-0.1055 <i>ns</i>	-0.2103 <i>ns</i>	-0.6869***
	South Asian (coeff.)	0.2493 <i>ns</i>	0.2601 <i>ns</i>	-0.7446***
	Black (coeff.)	-0.3809 <i>ns</i>	0.2368 <i>ns</i>	-1.2270***
	Other Visible Minority (coeff.)	0.1162 <i>ns</i>	-0.2764**	-0.9447***

Source: *Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2003).

Note: Controls include age and, for immigrants, year of immigration.

Coefficients represent the effect of visible minority status and specific visible minority group status. Logistic regression is used in cases of dichotomous dependent variables (Trust, Voting, Volunteering, Canadian Identity and Citizenship), and OLS regression is used in cases of dependent variables having more categories (Life Satisfaction and Belonging). In order to interpret the coefficients from the logistic regression results as odds ratios, the logistic coefficients must be exponentiated (presented only for visible minorities overall). Regression *N*'s (depending on the outcome variable): recent immigrants 2,484-2,640; earlier immigrants 7,796-8,031; second generation 15,185-15,445.

¹ The analysis of voting is restricted to eligible voters, namely, citizens and those at least 20 years old. Correspondingly, *N*'s will be lower than for other variables. The impact of citizenship on voting analysis may be inferred from citizenship rates shown in the table. Detailed *N*'s are available from the authors.

p* < 0.10 *p* < 0.05 ****p* < 0.01

ns = not significant

Effect of Household
Income, Perceived
Discrimination, and
Perceived Vulnerability
on Social Integration
among Visible
Minorities

Dependent variable	Regression equations ¹	Immigrants		Second generation
		Recent	Earlier	
Belonging	1 IE Household Income	-0.03474 <i>ns</i>	-0.09985***	0.02691 <i>ns</i>
	2 Perceived Discrimination ²	-0.10842***	-0.11650***	-0.07037**
	3 Perceived Vulnerability ²	-0.01005 <i>ns</i>	-0.04024 <i>ns</i>	-0.05714*
Trust	1 IE Household Income	0.0314 <i>ns</i>	0.1096***	0.0532***
	2 Perceived Discrimination	-0.1203***	-0.0748**	-0.0718***
	3 Perceived Vulnerability	-0.1718***	-0.1654***	-0.0834***
Canadian Identity	1 IE Household Income	0.0358 <i>ns</i>	0.0205 <i>ns</i>	0.0295*
	2 Perceived Discrimination	0.0184 <i>ns</i>	-0.0384 <i>ns</i>	-0.0147 <i>ns</i>
	3 Perceived Vulnerability	-0.1088*	-0.1339***	-0.0280*
Citizenship	1 IE Household Income	-0.00275 <i>ns</i>	0.1158 <i>ns</i>	n/a
	2 Perceived Discrimination	0.0108 <i>ns</i>	0.0761 <i>ns</i>	n/a
	3 Perceived Vulnerability	-0.0728***	-0.00723 <i>ns</i>	n/a

(cont. on p. 45)

Effect of Household
Income, Perceived
Discrimination, and
Perceived Vulnerability
on Social Integration
among Visible
Minorities
(cont. from p. 44)

Dependent variable	Regression equations ¹	Immigrants		Second generation
		Recent	Earlier	
Life Satisfaction	1 IE Household Income	0.02917 <i>ns</i>	0.06886**	0.04456 <i>ns</i>
	2 Perceived Discrimination	-0.23849***	-0.20134***	-0.14099***
	3 Perceived Vulnerability	-0.15010***	-0.14949***	-0.18680***
Volunteering	1 IE Household Income	-0.0859 <i>ns</i>	0.0721**	0.00897 <i>ns</i>
	2 Perceived Discrimination	0.1458***	0.1142***	0.0597***
	3 Perceived Vulnerability	0.0346 <i>ns</i>	0.0428 <i>ns</i>	0.00735 <i>ns</i>
Voting ³	1 IE Household Income	-0.0236 <i>ns</i>	0.0670**	0.0370 <i>ns</i>
	2 Perceived Discrimination	0.0573 <i>ns</i>	-0.0099 <i>ns</i>	-0.0259 <i>ns</i>
	3 Perceived Vulnerability	-0.0281 <i>ns</i>	0.0074 <i>ns</i>	0.0006 <i>ns</i>

Source: *Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2003).

Note: Coefficients represent the effect of (a) IE (individual-equivalent) Household Income (b) Perceived Discrimination and (c) Perceived Vulnerability for visible minorities after controlling for age and, for immigrants, years in Canada. Logistic regression is used in cases of dichotomous dependent variables (Trust, Voting, Volunteering, Canadian Identity and Citizenship), and OLS regression is used in cases of dependent variables having more categories (Life Satisfaction and Belonging). In order to interpret the coefficients from the logistic regression results as odds ratios, the logistic coefficients must be exponentiated. All regression coefficients are standardized.

¹ Unweighted *N*'s: Regression 1 – recent immigrants 1,748-1,856; earlier immigrants 2,748-2,830; second generation 3,281-3,349. Regression 2 – recent immigrants 1,688-1,784; earlier immigrants 2,641-2,718; second generation 3,243-3,307. Regression 3 – recent immigrants 1,665-1,757; earlier immigrants 2,582-2,659; second generation 3,242- 3,308.

² Whereas a negative sign for Perceived Discrimination or Perceived Vulnerability indicates that these variables reduce social integration, it is a positive sign for IE Household Income, which indicates that low income reduces such integration.

³ The analysis of voting is restricted to eligible voters, namely, citizens and those at least 20 years old. Correspondingly, *N*'s will be lower than for other variables. The impact of citizenship on voting analysis may be inferred from citizenship rates shown in the table. Detailed *N*'s are available from the authors.

p* < 0.10 *p* < 0.05 ****p* < 0.01
ns = not significant

Effect of Visible
Minority Status on
Various Attachments
(Seven Measures),
Controlling for
Inequality, Perceived
Inequality, Recency of
Immigration and Age

Dependent variable	Regression equations ¹	Immigrants		Second generation
		Recent	Earlier	
Belonging	1	0.2443***	0.1809***	-0.3374***
	2	0.2303***	0.1787***	-0.3340***
	3	0.2661***	0.2300***	-0.2690***
Trust	1	-0.1625 <i>ns</i>	-0.4013***	-0.3202***
	2	-0.1326 <i>ns</i>	-0.3999***	-0.3359***
	3	0.0037 <i>ns</i>	-0.2229**	-0.1216*
Canadian Identity	1	0.0221 <i>ns</i>	-0.4542***	-0.8382***
	2	0.0226 <i>ns</i>	-0.4528***	-0.8478***
	3	0.0717 <i>ns</i>	-0.3499***	-0.7867***
Citizenship	1	0.2520*	1.3442***	n/a
	2	0.2502 <i>ns</i>	1.3591***	n/a
	3	0.2971*	1.3162***	n/a

(cont. on p. 47)

Effect of Visible
Minority Status on
Various Attachments
(Seven Measures),
Controlling for
Inequality, Perceived
Inequality, Recency of
Immigration and Age
(cont. from p. 46)

Dependent variable	Regression equations ¹	Immigrants		Second generation
		Recent	Earlier	
Life Satisfaction	1	-0.0248 <i>ns</i>	-0.0712 <i>ns</i>	-0.2220***
	2	-0.0148 <i>ns</i>	-0.0685 <i>ns</i>	-0.2273***
	3	0.1051 <i>ns</i>	0.0477 <i>ns</i>	-0.0857*
Volunteering	1	-0.0358 <i>ns</i>	0.0483 <i>ns</i>	-0.12162 <i>ns</i>
	2	-0.0359 <i>ns</i>	0.0569 <i>ns</i>	0.0365 <i>ns</i>
	3	-0.1259 <i>ns</i>	-0.0470 <i>ns</i>	-0.0551 <i>ns</i>
Voting ²	1	0.0120 <i>ns</i>	-0.0762 <i>ns</i>	-0.8932***
	2	0.0265 <i>ns</i>	-0.0743 <i>ns</i>	-0.9371***
	3	-0.0328 <i>ns</i>	-0.1334 <i>ns</i>	-0.8358***

Source: *Ethnic Diversity Survey 2002* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2003).

¹ Regression equations: 1 = time-related controls only; 2 = IE (individual equivalent) Household Income, plus time-related controls; 3 = IE Household Income, Perceived Discrimination, Perceived Vulnerability and time-related controls. Unweighted *N*'s: Regressions 1 and 2: recent immigrants 2,484-2,640; earlier immigrants 7,796-8,031; second generation 15,185-15,445. Regression 3: recent immigrants 2,340-2,463; earlier immigrants 7,323 to 7,529; second generation 14,924-15,173.

² The analysis of voting is restricted to eligible voters, namely, citizens and those at least 20 years old. Correspondingly, *N*'s will be lower than for other variables. The impact of citizenship on voting analysis may be inferred from citizenship rates shown in the table. Detailed numbers are available from the authors.

p* < 0.10 *p* < 0.05 ****p* < 0.01

ns = not significant

Notes

- 1 Data are based on the census metropolitan area (CMA). Municipalities within CMAs vary in their ethnic concentrations.
- 2 The Ethnic Diversity Survey was a post-census telephone survey conducted between April and August of 2002 using a sample of 41,695 persons aged 15 and over, excluding Aboriginal persons. One of its prime objectives was to “better understand how people’s backgrounds affect their participation in Canada’s social, economic and cultural life” (Statistics Canada 2002, 2), and so it included topics of direct relevance to overall social cohesion. The sample is a two-phase stratified sample, designed to enhance representation of ethnic minorities, including racial minority immigrants and the second generation. Data reported here are based on sample weights to compensate for sampling disproportions, with bootstrap weights used to assist in statistical assessment. The computer-assisted telephone interviews lasted an average of 35 to 45 minutes and were conducted in English or French, where possible, or in one of the following languages: Mandarin, Cantonese, Italian, Punjabi, Portuguese, Vietnamese or Spanish. The interview schedule had 14 modules containing detailed questions about ethnicity, immigration status and other aspects of demographic background; about socioeconomic activities; about attitudes toward life in Canada; and about civic participation and other aspects of interaction with society.
- 3 A more detailed presentation of the EDS data is available in Reitz and Banerjee (2005).
- 4 Individual-equivalent household incomes adjust household incomes for household size and are calculated by dividing household income by the square root of household size.
- 5 Among racial minorities, Japanese are the sole exception in having relatively high incomes. Of those identifying as White, the ones belonging to either a Latin American group or an Arab/West Asian group have relatively low incomes. In these two categories, the majority actually do not identify as White. In the census data, these two groups appear both as White and as visible minorities. The categories Latin American and Arab/West Asian are based on responses to census questions on ethnic origins. Some of those who indicate that they have these origins give the response “White” on the visible minority question and are considered not to be visible minorities for this table; the rest are considered visible minorities. Among White ethnic groups, these two have by far the highest poverty rates, although these rates are lower than those of the two categories of people who do not consider themselves White. Apart from these exceptions, all White groups have higher incomes than the most affluent racial minorities (see Reitz and Banerjee 2005).
- 6 These data refer to the proportion below the low-income cutoff, based on relative income and taking into account family size and urban area of residence. Statistics Canada does not describe this as a poverty measure, but it is commonly interpreted as such.
- 7 Michael Ornstein notes in his widely cited analysis of 1996 Census data on racial inequalities that while a “socio-economic polarization” exists between European and non-European groups in Toronto, there are significant variations among minorities. Rates of poverty are relatively high for the largest visible minorities — Blacks (44.6 percent), Chinese (29.4 percent) and South Asians (34.6 percent) — but they are highest for Ethiopians, Ghanaians, Afghans and Somalis, among whom poverty rates reach 50 to 80 percent and higher (Ornstein 2000).
- 8 Reitz (2006) provides an extensive overview of determinants of immigrant employment success in Canada, including

- the trend toward declining immigrant earnings discussed later in this chapter.
- 9 Reitz's analysis shows that the decline in employment rates has the greatest impact on the most recently arrived; it has a continuing impact on women, in particular (2001b). However, most noticeable is the decline in the earnings of those who have found employment.
 - 10 The decline in immigrant earnings in Canada has been steeper than the parallel decline reported in the US by George Borjas (1999). In the US, the decline appears to be primarily attributable to an increase in the proportion of immigrants of Mexican or Latin American origin. For immigrants of similar origin, labour market success in Canada has declined to levels previously seen in the US. In effect, the convergence of the US and Canadian educational systems, particularly at the post-secondary level in the 1970s and 1980s, has produced a marked convergence in the labour market circumstances faced by immigrants and in their earnings (Reitz 2003a).
 - 11 See the reviews by Reitz (2006) and Picot and Sweetman (2005).
 - 12 The hypothesis that the language skills of immigrants have been poorer in recent years has not received support (Ferrer and Riddell 2004). Existing data suggest that the official language skills of immigrants who arrived in 2000 were about the same as those who arrived a decade earlier.
 - 13 The question was, "How often do you feel uncomfortable or out of place in Canada *now* because of your ethnicity, culture, race, skin colour, language, accent or religion? Is it all of the time, most of the time, some of the time, rarely, or never?" ("Now" was emphasized because the previous question was similar but focused on the time before respondents turned 15.)
 - 14 The respondent was read the following statement and question: "In Canada, hate crimes are legally defined as crimes motivated by the offender's bias, prejudice or hatred based on the victim's race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation or any other similar factor. Using a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is not worried at all and 5 is very worried, how worried are you about becoming the victim of a crime in Canada because of someone's hatred of your ethnicity, culture, race, skin colour, language, accent or religion?"
 - 15 One exception is the Jewish group: 20 percent reported experiences of discrimination. The other exceptions are Latin Americans and Arabs/West Asians. These two are mixed categories in the sense that some of their members identify themselves as visible minority and others as White. Their reported experiences of discrimination occur at rates between the extremes represented by other visible minorities and other Whites.
 - 16 The 1992 Minority Survey conducted in Toronto showed that 78 percent of Blacks believed that their group was the target of employment discrimination (Dion and Kawakami 1996; see also Breton 1990, 208).
 - 17 In Ontario, a task force on access to trades and professions presented a report on the subject over a decade ago (Cumming, Lee, and Oreopoulos 1989), and a recent report by the Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities shows that immigrants still report difficulties (Goldberg 2000).
 - 18 The question was, "If two equally qualified people applied for a job, one White and one a visible minority, who do you think would be more likely to get it? The White person, the visible minority person, or would both have an equal chance?"
 - 19 In surveys, it appears that the role of government in addressing discrimination has not been a topic since the 1980s, when governments in Canada were actively concerned with equity issues. In 1987, the Charter Study found that 63.3 percent

agreed that “while equal opportunity to succeed is important for all Canadians, it’s not really the government’s job to guarantee it” (Reitz and Breton 1994, 87). Since that time, racial discrimination per se has been a much less frequently discussed topic. We pursue this matter in the concluding section of this chapter.

- 20 It is noteworthy that the disparities confronting immigrants in Canada are comparable in magnitude to those experienced by immigrants in other jurisdictions. For example, although immigrant earnings are higher in Canada than they are in the US (Borjas 1999), Canadian immigrants do not have higher earnings relative to qualifications. In fact, in Canada, as in the US and Australia, immigrants from certain groups — mainly non-European — have performed less well relative to qualifications (Reitz 1998). Black immigrants and those of various Asian groups may therefore expect it to take longer for them to become fully integrated into the Canadian workforce. These patterns are roughly similar in Canada and the US (Reitz and Breton 1994), and, if anything, immigrant earnings relative to qualifications are slightly higher in the US (Baker and Benjamin 1994).
- 21 For native-born men of European origin, the rate is 51.3 percent; for visible minority immigrant men, it is 64.5 percent; and for visible minority native-born men, it is 68.6 percent. The overall patterns reported by Davies and Guppy show that high school completion rates vary considerably among specific native-born visible minority groups. Among men, they reach a high of 92.5 percent for Koreans, followed by Chinese at 79.4 percent, Filipinos at 73.3 percent, South Asians at 72.6 percent, Arabs/West Asians at 70.8 percent, Japanese at 69.1 percent, Latin Americans at 64.1 percent, Blacks at 55.4 percent, other Pacific Islanders at 54.2 percent and Southeast Asians at 50.0 percent; the latter is the only group for which the rate is

lower than for nonvisible minority men. Among visible minority women, the rank order is almost identical: Koreans, 83.3 percent; Chinese, 80.4 percent; Filipinos, 78.1 percent; South Asians, 75.5 percent; Arabs/West Asians, 73.2 percent; Latin Americans, 71.4 percent; Japanese, 69.2 percent; other Pacific Islanders, 61.3 percent; Blacks, 57.6 percent; and Southeast Asians, 53.3 percent.

- 22 A few studies have focused on educational opportunity and the accessibility of education to the second generation. Because of the need to regress educational attainment onto characteristics of parents, these studies cannot use census data; instead they employ special-purpose surveys. Consequently, samples are small, and there is little detail on groups of particular origins. The studies suggest that educational opportunities for native-born racial minorities in Canada are comparable to those for the native-born population in terms of levels of education attained (Boyd and Grieco 1998, based on the General Social Survey; Boyd 2002, based on the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics), academic performance based on parent and teacher assessments, and formal testing (Worswick 2001, based on the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth). These analyses have been interpreted as suggesting that educational attainment for immigrant children in Canada is better than it is for their counterparts in the US (see, for example, Boyd 2002), though explicit empirical comparison has not been done. The US studies that have shown the most negative trends in this regard have focused on groups, such as Mexicans and Cubans, that are not prominent among immigrant groups in Canada (for example, Portes and Rumbaut 2001).
- 23 Social cohesion, in this sense, is similar to social capital, which is defined as collective resources that facilitate action. Robert Putnam’s observation that ethnic diversity

- in the US reduces social capital is thus quite relevant (2003). The significance of inequality for recent immigration in the US underscores its potential role in the analysis and suggests that disentangling the relations of diversity, inequality and social commitments is essential (Letki 2005), since they relate to the strength and resilience of the social fabric.
- 24 The specific wording of the seven questions was:
- ◆ Feelings of belonging: “How strong is your sense of belonging to Canada?” This followed a section in which respondents were asked to rate their sense of belonging to family, ethnic or cultural group, municipality and province on a five-point scale, from not strong at all to very strong.
 - ◆ Trust in others: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?” This was followed by an assessment of the trustworthiness of family members, people in the neighbourhood and people at work or school.
 - ◆ Canadian citizenship: “Of what country, or countries, are you a citizen?”
 - ◆ Canadian identity: “What is your ethnic or cultural identity?” This was asked after a series of questions on ancestry, which was prefaced by this statement: “I would now like you to think about *your own* identity, in ethnic or cultural terms. This identity may be the same as that of your parents, grandparents or ancestors, or it may be different.”
 - ◆ Life satisfaction: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” Respondents were asked to reply using a scale of 1 to 5; 1 means not satisfied at all, and 5 means very satisfied.
 - ◆ Volunteer activity: “At any time in the past 12 months, did you volunteer your time to help with the activities of your organization?” These were organizations of which the respondent was a member or in whose activities the respondent had taken part — sports clubs, religious groups, hobby clubs, charitable groups and the like. Interviewers were instructed that only unpaid work, and not financial contribution, could be considered.
- ◆ Voting: “Did you vote in the last federal election?” Respondents were also asked about provincial and municipal elections; the responses were highly correlated, and the analysis here focuses on federal election participation.
- 25 As indicated in the previous note, the question used to tap self-identification as Canadian asked about ethnic or cultural identity, and for this question up to six responses were coded. Here, the analysis looks at whether respondents give “Canadian” as any one of the six responses, with a view to determining the extent to which the identity of Canadian is salient among the various ethnic identities significant to respondents.
- 26 Reported rates of voting in the EDS are higher than the actual voter turnout in federal elections, which is expected in a survey if voting is considered socially conforming behaviour. In any case, group differences are meaningful in the present context. For a discussion of voting in nonofficial language groups, see Jedwab (2005).
- 27 In this study, individuals who reported that they were not eligible to vote were removed from the voting analysis. Others appear to have responded “No” to the question on voting when in fact they were ineligible at the time of the last federal election before the survey (November 2000). To eliminate all those who were ineligible, voting analyses are based on individuals over the age of 20 (as the EDS was conducted in 2002).
- 28 Note that for reference, the figures for third and higher generations of European origin

are presented. In the case of self-identification as Canadian, third-and-higher-generation respondents are *less* likely to report a Canadian identification than second-generation respondents of European origin. For these persons, self-identification as Canadian is very likely taken for granted, and in this context it is not relevant to the question asked. Hence, the second-generation respondents of European origin are the most meaningful benchmark for comparison with the racial minority second generation.

- 29 Logistic regression is used in cases of dichotomous dependent variables (trust, voting, volunteering, Canadian identity and citizenship), and OLS regression is used in cases of dependent variables having more categories (satisfaction and belonging). In order to interpret the coefficients from the logistic regression results as odds ratios, we must exponentiate the logistic coefficients (see appendix 2).
- 30 Again, logistic regression is used in cases of dichotomous dependent variables (trust, voting, volunteering, Canadian identity and citizenship), and OLS regression is used in cases of dependent variables having more categories (satisfaction and belonging). All coefficients shown are standardized.
- 31 As well, there may be a perception that enthusiasm for multiculturalism waned as the emphasis shifted from culture to equity.

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